

# FUNDAMENTALS OF DEMOCRACY

by

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Nowadays democracy appears as a sort of taboo, a sacred concept; as Jean Madiran states: *'The only modern dogma which rules from one end of the universe to the other, a dogma which does not necessarily demand faith but which nevertheless is received with reverence everywhere.'*<sup>1</sup> Without even taking the trouble to define the term, it has replaced the notions of order, disorder, justice or injustice.

What do we mean by democracy? The word brings to mind popular sovereignty, the rights of man, the equality of citizens, the election of leaders. In fact it describes political regimes where election plays a substantial part, and can be reduced to three types which we will call classical democracy, modern democracy<sup>2</sup> and organic democracy.

**Classical democracy** is a political regime where the leaders are elected by their subordinates (directly or indirectly).

**Modern democracy** is a political regime organised according to the principle of classical democracy and having adopted the ideology of the rights of man according to the model of 1789 (and, above all, the doctrine of popular sovereignty by which all power comes from the people). Two distinct things are in question here: on the one hand a means of appointing governments, in other words a political technique, and on the other hand the justification and completion of this technique by what is called the democratic ideology.

<sup>1</sup> Jean Madiran, *Les deux démocraties* (NEL)

<sup>2</sup> These terms classical and modern democracy we have taken from the vocabulary used by Madiran in *Les deux démocraties*.

**Organic democracy** is a regime using elections not to appoint the political leaders but national representatives to the political power (representing the various social bodies - hence the term organic).

Classical democracy and modern democracy function in general by the same methods, and are put in operation by the same apparatus.

This leads us to divide the subject into four parts:

- **Classical democracy**, its characteristics, its limits, the risks run by countries which adopt it.
- **Modern democracy** and its doctrine of popular sovereignty;
- **The democratic apparatus and methods:** the technique of Philosophical-societies and of a controlling nucleus.
- **Organic democracy.**

We must remember, however, that today democracy is often understood as modern democracy.<sup>3</sup>

## FIRST PART

### CLASSICAL DEMOCRACY

#### A Regime where the government is elected by the governed

##### I Characteristics

- **Definition**

Here is the definition given by Jean Madiran in his book *Les deux démocraties* (The Two Democracies)

*‘Classical democracy is that which has existed in all times, or almost so, and which we could even call eternal, in a relative sense. It is a means of appointing rulers. The appointment of the government by the governed, in accordance with electoral systems, occurs in all historical epochs to a lesser or greater extent. According to the time and place, bishops, kings, magistrates, presidents, dictators have been elected. The number and standing of the electors were varied because many “mixed” regimes existed, combining, in varying proportions, both the democratic and aristocratic systems. Where there is no such mixture **classical democracy consists of a City<sup>4</sup> in which there is no political authority where the leader is not appointed, (directly or indirectly) for a limited period by the citizens, all of whom are electors.** (p.8 our emphasis)*

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. the definition in Robert: **Democracy:** Political doctrine according to which sovereignty must belong to the citizens as a whole; form of government in which the people exercise this sovereignty. **Democracy places the origin of political power in the collective will of the citizens.**

<sup>4</sup> The use of city in this sense describes the organisation of civic life in a nation, city state, or other political entity.

## • Clarification On The Role Of Elections

A brief summary, here, of the structure of the state will permit us to understand the role of elections more fully.<sup>5</sup>

The state comprises:

- ◇ A central organ (the Government) having the power of decision and whose activity can be divided into four principal functions: governmental, legislative, administrative and jurisdictional.
- ◇ A collection of services indispensable to this central organ which allows it to exercise these functions, for the common good: security, legislative, representative,<sup>6</sup> administrative and financial services.

Groups other than the State are normally organised in a similar manner.

With the State (and these other groups) being structured in such a way, what role is there for elections?

It is necessary here to distinguish why elections are carried out, who are the electors, and who is eligible to participate. The following distinctions may be made:

### Why are elections carried out?

1. To appoint persons having the power of decision (Head of State, Mayor...).
2. To appoint representatives of the people or of social bodies (the representative function).
3. To make certain political decisions (referenda; Swiss voting).

### Who are the electors?

- A. - All the citizens.
- B. - The representatives of people or social bodies.
- C. - Elected persons of distinction.
- D. - Non-elected persons of distinction.
- E. - Those appointed by the Head of State.

### Who are eligible to be elected:

- a - All candidates who present themselves as such and who satisfy certain conditions.
- b - Persons belonging to a particular group or who satisfy particular conditions but who don't have to present themselves as candidates.

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<sup>5</sup> An exposé on the structure of the State is given in a little more detail in the third part below. It is taken from the book by Marcel de la Bigne de Villeneuve *Lettres aux Constituants, éditions Rousseau, 1941.*

<sup>6</sup> Representation and Government ought to be distinct; whereas they are more or less confused as in many modern regimes: 'either there is no representation, or there is no government; or as is more frequently the case, Representation and Government find themselves at the same time, corrupt, distorted and unrecognizable' (M. de la Bigne de Villeneuve, *op.cit.*, p.153)

Some examples will permit us to illustrate the diversity of electoral systems (using the numbers and letters designating the categories above):

- **in the civil domain:**
- President of the French Republic: 1 A a
- French Senator: 2 C a. (Upper House)
  
- **in the religious domain:**
- The Pope: 1 E b.
- General of the Order of Chartreuse: 1 C b.

Classical democracy and organic democracy are distinguished principally by the fact that in the first political leaders are elected, whereas, in the second, election is limited to representatives of the people or social bodies.

### • The Place of Classical Democracy in the Classification of Political Regimes

Whenever we speak about a political regime, the first distinction to make is that of separating **hereditary systems** and **elected systems**. Maurras insisted repeatedly on this point. If we wish to make a further distinction we arrive at the following classifications:

#### **Hereditary Governments ( Governments by reigning families):**

- A - administered by several: aristocratic republic (Venice).
  
- B - administered by a single dynasty: hereditary monarchy (Capetians)

#### **Elected Governments:**

- C - administered by many:
  - parliamentary republic (The Third French Republic);
  - constitutional monarchy
  
- D - Administered by a single person
  - elected monarchy (the *ancien* regime in Poland)
  - presidential regime
  - dictatorship.

Classical democracy corresponds to the categories C and D of the table above. In fact reality is more complex than the outline. Here are some examples:

#### **The Republic of Venice:**

The rulers passed on their power by heredity (solution A), but they used an election to choose their leader, the Doge, and for certain decisions.

#### **The British Parliamentary System:**

This is a mixture of A (the House of Lords) and C; in fact A predominated for much of its history.

### **The Prussian Regime of the Nineteenth Century:**

This was a mixture of A (Chamber of the Lords), of B (the Hohenzollern monarchy) and of C (Chamber of Deputies) ... with B predominating.

- **Predominance of Hereditary Governments over Elected Governments**

- ◇ **The principle of heredity in civil society**

During the course of the last twenty centuries we see that the appointment of leaders by election is a system used more by the clergy than by the laity - that is natural.

Because of ecclesiastical celibacy, the clergy is constituted from a society of persons and not from a society of families and is thus not able to have recourse to heredity as a means of transmitting power. For this reason, the heads of different religious orders are either elected, ( e.g. the Pope, religious superiors, abbots, priors) or chosen by an authority which has itself been elected (Thus the bishops are appointed by the Pope who is elected by the cardinals).

In civil society there is no reason why the elective system should be adopted: the hereditary system appears much more natural.

After all:

- a nation is a collection of families;
- the State is the organisational apparatus of the nation;
- power is transmitted in the family by heredity.

It is therefore natural that the same system should be used for transmission of supreme power within the State.

This explains why, during the course of time, the hereditary system has been more frequently used than the elective system for the appointment of political leaders.

In his book *La démocratie religieuse* (Religious Democracy), Charles Maurras placed great emphasis on the natural character of the hereditary system of transmitting power. He even made it into a principle, the principle of heredity:

*'We have not said that monarchy was the only good form of government. We said exactly the opposite. We have cited times and countries where a Republic, based on an hereditary aristocracy and circumscribed by certain very specific conditions, was able to flourish and did so. What is eternal is the principle of heredity, this is the good thing about government by reigning families. Government by families may be managed by many families in an aristocratic system; it is a very delicate arrangement, however, and it is contingent on a number of favourable coincidences which are rarely met in history and geography. That is why these have been much less frequent than the other form of government by families which is managed by a single dynasty. Monarchy being the most simple type has succeeded most often.'*<sup>7</sup>

- ◇ **Hereditary powers are ubiquitous**

We must analyse this matter further.

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<sup>7</sup> C. Maurras, *La démocratie religieuse* (NEL., 1978), p.83 Available from *Action Familiale et Scolaire*, CCP:24.564.07 N-Paris, France 150F.



Charles Maurras remarks that the hereditary form of Government is so natural to civil society that it is nearly always practised, even when society is apparently under an elected government. He made the following observation on the subject in his book, *La démocratie religieuse*. (Pages 74, 95 and 96).

*'As long as men are begotten by flesh and blood and flesh and blood is spilled on the battlefield, it is by flesh and blood that the political order will be administered. Whether monarchic or oligarchic, ancient or modern, American or European, States (as States) are dedicated to the hereditary principle; and this is as true of the French republic as of the others.*

*The absolute, the immutable in political science is not the monarchy or government by one person, it is hereditary government, whether it be exercised by the head of a family or by several heads of families.*

(...)

*There rests the essential nature of human societies, which is to be composed of families and not individuals, and to unfold over the centuries and not solely concentrated into the life of one man.'*

These observations of the omni-presence of hereditary powers lets us see that true democracies (those where the elected leaders are the true leaders) may well be a great deal fewer than we are commonly led to believe.

## II The Limits and Disadvantages of Classical Democracy

Classical democracy is frequently presented as government of the people by the people and effected:

- **directly**, when the people themselves set the main political agenda (**direct democracy**).
- **indirectly**, through the intermediary of elected deputies and possibly by a leader who is himself elected. (**representative democracy**).

Here then is a summary of the advantages, disadvantages and limits of classical democracy whether of the direct or representative variety.

### • Limits of Direct Democracy Exercised through Referenda

Referenda are currently undertaken according to two methods.

- ◇ A referendum in which the Government takes the initiative, its aim being to obtain popular support for a policy already entered into in a quasi-irreversible manner ( e.g. in France the referenda on Algeria in 1962, the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, in Denmark the referenda on Maastricht in 1992 and 1993. (In Scotland the referendum on devolution 1997 - Ed. *Apropos*)
- ◇ A referendum by popular initiative such as that practised in Switzerland by plebiscite (and also sought in France by the Front National).

When a referendum is the initiative of the State we find that the odds are usually fixed, taking account of present democratic standards; the government presents the question it wishes, often deceptively, and throws all its weight on one side of the balance.

In a referendum arising from a popular initiative, the pressure exerted by the state is less noticeable ( it has not chosen the question being put to the people, nor the manner in which it is presented). But the manipulation of opinion by the media, who are themselves dependent on ideological and financial powers, renders a little illusory the freedom of expression that can be obtained by this means.

- **General Considerations on the Election of Leaders outside the Political Domain**

- ◇ **In the case of a religious society**

In this case, as we have already demonstrated, two systems for devolving power: election or nomination by a superior authority (who, when all is said and done, is himself elected).

When She has to hold an election, the Church has striven to reduce the disadvantages by measures which She is often the only one to enact. For example:

- Forbidding presenting oneself as a candidate.
- frequent use of an election in two stages (which reduces the risk of scheming);
- insistence on the doctrine according to which all power comes from God; subordinates know well that the leader they have elected does not hold his power from them.

The first of these measures was formerly used by the Roman Republic.

- ◇ **In the case of the Army or University**

In his book “*La réforme intellectuelle et morale de la France*” written after the defeat of 1870, Ernest Renan made sound comments on democracy in the army.

*‘Democracy is the strongest solvent of military organisation. Military organisation is founded on discipline; democracy is the negation of discipline.’ (p.54) (...)*

We will find analogous reflections in publications of the Trilaterals, an elitist group, and advocates of Globalism (which lets us learn that Globalism once triumphant will have no time for democracy in its ordinary sense):

*‘Democracy is only one way of constituting authority, and it is not necessarily a universally applicable one. In many situations the claims of expertise, seniority, experience, and special talents may override the claims of democracy as a way of constituting authority (...) A university where teaching appointments are subject to approval by students may be a more democratic university but it is not likely to be a better university. In similar fashion, armies in which the commands of officers have been subject to veto by the collective wisdom of their subordinates have almost invariably come to disaster on the battlefield. The arenas where democratic procedures are appropriate are, in short, limited.’<sup>8</sup>*

- **The Election of Political Leaders - Conditions where it might be recommended.**

St Thomas Aquinas treated the question thus in the *Summa Theologica*:

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<sup>8</sup> Samuel P Huntington, *The Crisis of Democracy- Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission*’ by Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki published by the New York University Press in 1975.

*'You see what St Augustine said in his Treatise on Free Will, in chapter 6 of the first book: If a people is reasonable, serious and very vigilant in its defence of the common-good, it is good to promulgate a law permitting it to appoint those magistrates who administer public affairs.<sup>9</sup> However, if this people becomes depraved little by little and abuses its suffrage, if it gives over government to scandalous persons and criminals, then it is fitting to remove from them the facility to make appointments and to return it to a small number of good men.'*<sup>10</sup>

It is rare to find people who are reasonable, serious and very vigilant in defence of the common good, and the second hypothesis is more likely to be the case today.

Hence the observation by the philosopher Alain:

*'The democratic system accepts that reason guides the popular masses, when in fact the truth is that generally they obey their passions more. Every fiction will be atoned for because truth will avenge itself.'*

*'That is why democracy, so great in theory, can, in practice, lead to such flagrant horrors.'*<sup>11</sup>

- **The Election of a Head of State - Its Disadvantages**

*'The electoral system cannot be accepted as the only basis of a government. (...) When applied to choosing the sovereign, the election encourages charlatanism and destroys in advance the prestige of the person elected. It obliges him to humiliate himself before those who must obey him. There is every greater reason for this to be so when he is elected by universal suffrage.'* When applied to the choice of deputies universal suffrage, as long as it is direct, will never give rise to much more than the mediocre. Universal suffrage is essentially narrow-minded and does not understand the necessity of knowledge nor the superiority of the noble and the wise.<sup>12</sup>

- **Democracy and Public Safety**

*'The interests of the nation and those of an elected assembly are in opposition. The elected assembly is always concerned about re-election and is pawn to the highest bidder and all manner of haggling. The interests of the nation are thus hostage to a force which neither by chance, nor accident nor hypothesis, nor illusion, is tied to the permanent nature of man. It ravages without respite, from above and below, the very mechanism of government and administration.'*

*'As long as they remain elected, they are, as such, servile accomplices of every national ill which earns them votes. As such, and for as long as elections exist, they are irreformable by definition. The electoral virus regularly drives them to acts which ruin the health of the State and corrupt the public spirit'*<sup>13</sup>

- **Democracy and Centralisation**

*'Centralisation is both a natural consequence and the necessary character of democracy. This causes a fragmentation of sovereignty and governmental ataxia (failure in co-ordination) which is clearly very dangerous for the unity and*

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<sup>9</sup> In his 1944 Christmas Message on democracy, Pius XII put forward similar conditions: he indicated that classical democracy is viable *'for peoples whose moral and spiritual temperament is sufficiently sound and fertile.'*

<sup>10</sup> St Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, tII-97, 1. Quoted by Jean Madiran, *Les deux démocraties*, p. 10.

<sup>11</sup> Quoted by Jean Haupt, *Le Procès de la démocratie*, p. 20.

<sup>12</sup> E. Renan, op. cit., p.44.

<sup>13</sup> *Action française*, 14th December 1915.

stability of the State. Thereafter it proves necessary to take essential measures to prevent the break-up of the country and to remedy the more stupid blunders arising from the supreme ignorance of the masses. Centralisation is one of these measures. What the State loses in cohesion by its very principle, it tries to regain by concentration of social and administrative matters. Thus the person being governed pays in practice for his theoretical exalted status as a citizen.’<sup>14</sup>

- **Democracy and War**

Democracies are not naturally peaceful and may be easily driven to war as certain historical examples show. Here is an example from ancient Greece:

*‘At Athens it was not democracy which aspired to limit ambition, filthy lucre, or the game of throwing human lives onto the bloody tapestry of war; orators and merchants were of one accord with the populace in support of a blind imperialism, the politics of impulse and passion.’*

*‘The men of peace were the reactionaries, the aristocratic parties, formed or directed by landowners whose past had been rooted in the soil of their country for many years and who had something to lose from the mortal hazards of combat. They wanted to know that the benefits would be worth the trouble and risk. They judged things in the manner of our former kings who, though fallible as men are, took their stand on the infallible principle which declared that war, being a grave and terrible thing, ought not to be entered into lightly and entails much deliberation and responsibility.’<sup>15</sup>*

- **Democracy and the tendency towards Egalitarianism**

In a highly hierarchical society which allows a well-defined section of the population to vote there is no great tendency towards egalitarianism.

But, in a society where social differences are being flattened out political habits dictate that the vote and equal rights are given not to a section of the people but to all. This of necessity encourages egalitarianism. The right of election, thus practised, is egalitarian; it neither recognises seniority or competence; from whence develops the tendency in politics to scorn both of these. There is something contrary to nature in this fundamental equality brought about by universal suffrage in a field where men are not equal.

- **The Slide Towards Modern Democracy**

When it elects its leaders, a people has a tendency to believe it confers on them not only their appointment but also their powers.

This makes us slide from classical democracy (a political organisation where the leaders are elected) to modern democracy (otherwise called the doctrine of popular sovereignty). The formula, ‘*Omnis potestas a Deo*’ (all power comes from God) is replaced by ‘*Omnis potestas a populo*’ (all power comes from the people) and in the social and political field the cult of man is substituted for the cult of God.

(This matter will be dealt with more fully in the second part which deals with modern democracy)

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<sup>14</sup> Marcel de la Bigne de Villeneuve, *Lettres aux Constituants*, p.159.

<sup>15</sup> *Action française*, 19th April 1923

- **The Colonisation of the Democratic State by Pressure Groups**

This is particularly visible in France and is the reason why classical democracy is such a bad solution for our country.

- **The Heritage of the 1789 Revolution**

In suppressing a great number of intermediate bodies, and in removing from those that did remain a great number of their powers, the Revolution of 1789 effected a real social devastation of which the State itself was the first victim.

*'By the Revolution France had been placed in a material condition very similar to democratic individualism. All natural organisations had been broken up, the individual devoid of social ties became like a speck of dust with no social cohesion. At the same time foreign organisations did not cease to expand and planted themselves in French society because their internal discipline was maintained and they established themselves aided by our disintegration. The democratic doctrine turns the state into a self-providing agency (the Welfare State) and the governed into pensioners and its most powerful instrument of propaganda and conquest.*

*Those organisations outside the State, who seek to maintain their domination over us, seek as the basis of their programme to prevent the French from organising themselves. These organisations also make their way into the administration which they use as their instrument.'*<sup>16</sup>

- **A Structural Weakness of Classical Democracy**

Independent of the cause of the weakness we have described in the French State, we must recognise that, by the very nature of its structure, classical democracy is hardly able to prevent colonisation by pressure groups. (Often called lobbies, a term borrowed from the American lexicon.)

This has been emphasised by the academician and historian François Furet, in this statement which has become a classic: *'In all democratic governments there is (...) a hidden oligarchy which is, at the same time, contrary to the principles of democratic government yet indispensable to its functioning.'*<sup>17</sup>

While François Furet mentions one oligarchy, experience tells us that it might be better to speak of several oligarchies.

- **The Financial Dynasties**

As soon as we mention pressures bearing upon the State we immediately bring to mind the money-power or more exactly the power of those who possess money, otherwise known as the power of financial dynasties.

For an explanation of the political role of these dynasties one need go no further than the recent book by Jacques Attali<sup>18</sup> entitled *'Sigmund Warburg, a man of Influence'* which is adequately supported by historical references. He writes:

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<sup>16</sup> Charles Maurras, *Gazette de France*, 27 July 1904.

<sup>17</sup> François Furet, *Penser la Révolution française* (p. 241). In the last forty pages of this book from which the quotation above is taken, F. Furet summarises the views of the historian, Augustin Cochin, on the French Revolution.

<sup>18</sup> Jacques Attali was an advisor to François Mitterand, former President of France.

*'In the last two centuries it is the financier far more than the artist or the industrialist whose influence has been unquestionable: the man who directly or indirectly finances princes.'* (Page 5.)

When he describes their organisation Attali shows that financiers are *'linked to each other in a close and almost dynastic network'* and constitute a *'parallel aristocracy lodged at the heart of every regime'* *'A dynastic elite based on culture as well as money.'* (Page 48.) *'As pioneers of capitalist rationalism and founding witnesses of the merchant order, they are essential links in our history (...). They eventually organised themselves into a strange aristocracy, a kind of austere order, with implacable moral laws and savage rituals (...)* (Page 6.)

Describing the influence that these financiers exercise over men of power, Attali shows that they can constitute *'a power over the power'*. Does this last phrase mean that the financial dynasties discretely dominate the political power? That occurs particularly when the regime is democratic.

One can therefore state that the modern state has sold or leased its soul to the bankers. This becomes even more true when the State itself completely abandons to them the power to mint money.

- **Other Lobbies**

Financial dynasties are evidently not the only pressure groups attempting to colonise the democratic state.

- ◇ **Freemasonry**

We may consider freemasonry as the model lobby both by virtue of its antiquity (280 years officially, but in fact much more) and by its know-how.

A few years ago an article in *L'Express* of 7th October 1988 entitled *'Freemasons - the Return to Power'* remarked:

*One would almost think that the Third Republic had returned since Freemasons were so identified with the State as to constitute its backbone (...) We counted not less than a good dozen Ministers and a hundred parliamentary "initiates".'*

Things have changed little today. In his recent book *Au coeur du pouvoir - Enquête sur le club le plus puissant de France* <sup>19</sup>(At the heart of Power -Enquiry into the most powerful club in France) Emmanuel Ratier shows that 8 members of the Juppé cabinet - including the prime minister - belonged to or had belonged to the club *'Le Siècle'* which is notorious for its Masonic background. <sup>20</sup>

Now and then Masonic pressure on the political authority causes disquiet among some parliamentarians: such was the case in Italy in 1984 with the P2 Lodge; such has also been the case in Great Britain where a parliamentary commission (at the initiative of the Labour Party) proposed that Freemasons declare their affiliation in an official register and reproached them *'for having infiltrated the Police and the Judiciary, and of maintaining parallel structures of decision making that were inimical to the proper exercise of justice.'*<sup>21</sup>

- ◇ **B'nai Brith**

<sup>19</sup> On sale from *Action Familiale et Scolaire*, 198F

<sup>20</sup> On this question see the article in the April 1997 issue of *Action Familiale et Scolaire* (No. 130) *Un État inféodé aux forces occultes*. On the general influence of Freemasonry in politics, see the brochure *Connaissance élémentaire de la franc-maçonnerie* available from Action Familiale et Scolaire.(AFS). Now available as *Apropos* No. 22.

<sup>21</sup> *Le Monde*, 8th April 1997. On the P2 affair see the *'petit chronique maçonnique'* in no. 59 of AFS

Another notable lobby is *B'nai Brith* and all the forces which line up behind or alongside it.<sup>22</sup>

In a brochure entitled '*What they have hidden from you - How an interdict has been imposed: Never become allied to the "Front National" under any Circumstances.*'<sup>23</sup> Jean Madiran exposes, with the proof to back it up, what he calls '*the dominating influence of B'nai Brith over the French political class.*'

The action of similar Lobbies is found abroad, particularly in the United States. The book by US Senator Paul Findley '*They dare to speak out*'<sup>24</sup> gives us a striking example of this. It is sufficient however to read the testimony given by Gore Vidal in a foreword to the book by Israël Shahak '*Jewish History, Jewish Religion -The Weight of three thousand years*'<sup>25</sup>:

*'Sometime in the late 1950's, that world class gossip and occasional historian, John F Kennedy, told me how, in 1948, Harry S Truman had been pretty much abandoned by everyone when he came to run for president. Then an American Zionist brought him 2 million dollars in cash, in a suitcase, aboard his whistle stop tour. "That's why our recognition of Israel was rushed through so fast." As neither Jack nor I was an anti-Semite (...) we took this to be just another funny story about Truman and the serene corruption of American politics.'*

If in 1948 the Zionist lobby was capable of having its candidate elected to the presidency of the United States, one can only imagine what its influence might be today.

#### ◇ **The Protestant Power**

Protestant High Society in France (H.S.P.) has played an important role for the last two hundred years out of all proportion to its numerical strength. It constitutes what *Le Matin* magazine of 6th Dec. 1982 called a "Protestant Power" which it characterised thus:

*'Having been installed for some time in the great organs of the State, embassies or public enterprises, Protestants have quietly occupied high posts in the new government. Their flirtation with the French left is not opportunistic: republican by tradition, they have always supported Socialist ideas.'*

Nine years later *Nouvel observateur* of 31st January 1991 said much the same:

*'In Secular and Republican France's roll-of-honour first place is given to the Protestants, particularly in politics and the administration. In fact save for the beginning of the anti-clerical Third Republic which they brought to the baptismal font, and which served them so well, never had such a host of Huguenots participated in the management of the country.'*<sup>26</sup>

#### ◇ **Political Parties And Trade Unions**

The action of these pressure groups while not the most important is undoubtedly the most visible. The action of the Socialist Party during François Mitterrand's two terms of office justify this judgement of Pierre Bécac:

<sup>22</sup> *B'nai Brith* was presented in *Le Monde* of 2nd/3rd March 1997 as '*A Jewish-American fraternity inspired by free-masonry.*' On this subject see the book by Emmanuel Ratier, *Mystères du B'nai Brith* available from AFS (195F)

<sup>23</sup> Published in French by *Diffusion Difralivre* and available from AFS (30F)

<sup>24</sup> Published by Lawrence Hill and Company, 520 Riverside Ave., Westport, Connecticut 06880, USA

<sup>25</sup> Available from the publisher Pluto Press at 345 Archway Rd, London N6 5AA, England, or 1436 West Randolph, Chicago, Illinois 60607, USA. (Reprinted 1997 ISBN 0-7453-0819-8).

<sup>26</sup> On this subject see the Apropos booklet "The Fundamentals of Protestantism" available from Apropos.

'Under cover of this dogma of popular sovereignty, the political parties have come to power by some means or other and have exercised a real dictatorship in the name of the sovereign people (...)'<sup>27</sup>

As for the trade unions, many among them, such as the CGT, have, since the beginning of the Fourth Republic, constituted apparently, impregnable bastions. In certain areas (transport, energy, commercial ports, press distribution) and in certain cases, they were able to impose their will upon the Government.

#### ◇ Sects

By means of their discipline, material resources and desire for power, some sects behave like strong feudal powers which democratic governments are obliged to come to terms with. Such is the case with the Church of Scientology and, in the United States, that of the Moonies.<sup>28</sup>

#### ◇ The Mafias

We define as mafias those pressure groups founded on organised crime and living on trafficking of different sorts (drugs, prostitution...).

Already in 1951, in his remarkable book "Far and Wide" on the USA, the English journalist Douglas Reed demonstrated that organised crime was one of the three constraints shackling the American State, the two others being political Zionism and Soviet Communism.<sup>29</sup>

The political role of Israel's Mafia is well known thanks to the book "Israel Connection" (éditions Plons 1980) and is documented thus by the author Jacques Derogy in the preface:

'(We note in Israel) the rapid expansion of a Mafia which in proportion was as organised, structured, and as influential in the political arena, police and administration, and as murderous as the American crime syndicate - with which it has close relations - or the Sicilian Cosa Nostra. As a phenomenon which appeared from the beginning of the State, it was the more serious for having developed more rapidly than the State itself, to the point of becoming a sort of state in what was meant to be a model state in the eyes of its founders, its inhabitants and the Jews of the Diaspora.'

Another well-known political fact is the formidable hold exercised by Mafias on certain Latin American states by means of what we call narco-terrorism.<sup>30</sup>

We must recognise that the abolition of the death penalty in many democratic states has contributed to reinforce Mafia - power.

#### ◇ The Homosexual Network

In the USA where homosexuality is more widespread than Europe, the political influence of Homosexual networks is considerable, as is borne out in the book 'The Homosexual Network - Private Lives and Public Policy' by Fr. Enrique T Rueda.<sup>31</sup>

In this field we note alas that Europeans are making up ground fast.

<sup>27</sup> Pierre Bécot, *Regards sur la décadence*, p.18., quoted in No 749 of *Lectures Françaises*.

<sup>28</sup> On this subject refer to the book by Serge Faubert, *Une secte au coeur de la République*, published by éditions Calmann-Lévy, 1993.

<sup>29</sup> Douglas Reed, op.cit., p. 271-272.

<sup>30</sup> See the book on this subject by Philippe Burin des Rozières, *Cultures mafieuses*, édit. Stock, 1995.

<sup>31</sup> Published by Devin Adair, 1983..



'We have been astonished by the omnipresence of homosexual networks' declared Sophie Coignard and Marie-Thérèse Guichard <sup>32</sup> in an interview given to *L'événement du jeudi* of 10th April 1997; they add: 'It is a new phenomenon. People freely talk about it, especially those in high public positions and in the political classes'.<sup>33</sup>

We do not pretend the above inventory of pressure groups is complete, but it does give examples of the types which more or less colonise modern democracies.

When the latter thus fall under the thrall of private interests how can they defend and promote the common good (which is the role and *raison d'être* of the state).

### III THE CHURCH AND CLASSICAL DEMOCRACY

In its traditional teaching, the Church considers classical democracy as one of three political types, one of those three great forms of government (along with monarchy and aristocracy), all of which are legitimate if certain conditions are respected.

Discussing different political regimes, Leo XIII wrote: '*Nothing prevents the Church approving government by one or by the many provided that it is just and ordained towards the common good. That is why, justice being preserved it is not forbidden for the people to choose for themselves the form of government which best corresponds with their character or with the institutions and customs handed down by their forefathers.*' (Diuturnum, 29th June 1881)

St. Pius X in his Letter on the Sillon ( 25th August 1910) reproduced the latter part of this text and also commented thus: '*And the Encyclical alludes to the three well known forms of government (...). Therefore, when he said that justice could be found in any of the three aforesaid forms of government, he was teaching that, in this respect, democracy does not enjoy a special privilege.*' In another passage in the same letter he stated '*we do not have to demonstrate here that the advent of universal democracy is of no concern to the action of the Church in the world; we have already recalled that the Church has always left to the nations the care of giving themselves the form of government which they think most suited to their needs*'.

More recently there has taken place, what Romano Amerio in his book *Iota Unum*,<sup>34</sup> calls '*a variation on the doctrine on democracy*': traditional doctrine made (classical) democracy a species of political genre and not the genre itself (...). Post-conciliar thought later elevated to the rank of common opinion (this novelty) that the participation of all individuals in the government of the community is a matter of natural justice and that thus Monarchy, the exercise by a single person of the power to govern society according to justice, ceases to be a legitimate form of government and ranks among the illegitimate forms for the simple reason that it is opposed to popular regimes, which alone are legitimate.

Thus classical democracy has become '*The only legitimate form of civil society*'.

In fact things are more complex than Romano Amerio would have us understand. Beside these texts justifying the last conclusion there is a declaration of John Paul II in the Encyclical *Centesimus annus* which can perhaps be understood as making an implicit reference to the traditional doctrine on (classical) democracy, where John Paul II writes: '*The Church values the democratic system*'. He would not speak about it in this way if he considered it obligatory.

<sup>32</sup> Authors of the book, *Bonnes fréquentations, histoire secrète des réseaux*, published by Grasset, 1997.

<sup>33</sup> This was clearly written well before the universal acceptance of the homosexual lifestyle in liberal Western democracies – an acceptance which has been made manifest by increasing moves to legalise same-sex 'marriage'. (editor, *Apropos*.)

<sup>34</sup> Now available in an English edition.

## Conclusion of the first part

These brief remarks on classical democracy have led us to bring to the fore two key ideas:

- the character of temporal powers which is very often hereditary (this is in the nature of things).
- the means by which democratic regimes allow themselves to be colonised by pressure groups which themselves are often constituted on an hereditary basis.

In our epoch marked by Maastricht and an accelerated advance towards Globalism, pressure groups have strengthened their influence and often serve as relays (where they are not integral parts) for some international organisations (international Masonic bodies, the international order of B'nai Brith, Trilaterals, Bilderbergers....) whose objective is the disappearance of nations and the advent of a New World Order.

How can we explain why democratic regimes have become the norm in Western countries? Principally because they are easily manipulated. Following the French Revolution and the wars in Europe, oligarchies, principally financial, have succeeded in penetrating the body politic and there hold sway. Being based on a hereditary principle and deriving from this a great deal of their strength, they understand that it is necessary to destroy the hereditary principle in the political domain if they wish to secure their domination - that is why heredity has been replaced by election and why monarchical and aristocratic regimes have been replaced by democratic regimes.

- What can we do?

It is obvious that **in the immediate term** it is necessary to make the most of the political regimes and elections that are imposed on us. It is necessary to play the democratic game insofar as we can play it.

**Simultaneously** it is necessary to alert our fellow citizens of goodwill to the harmful nature of classical democracy, a regime which serves as a smoke-screen for anti-national forces, whether discreet or occult, and permits them to indulge in their stratagems with impunity. Above all, we need to develop political education in this direction.

## SECOND PART

### MODERN DEMOCRACY

#### The doctrine of popular sovereignty and the regime which follows on from it.

Classical democracy - Modern democracy: We reproduce here the distinction and the vocabulary used by Jean Madiran in his book "Les deux démocraties". In practice, when the term democracy is used nowadays it is almost always modern democracy that is intended.

#### I. Characteristics

##### • Definition

Classical democracy, which was characterised by the appointment of a government by the governed, can be considered as a simple political technique without any connection to any particular doctrine. *Modern* democracy introduces a doctrine, or rather it is a doctrine before being a form of government. These two aspects are fully emphasised in the definition already cited which the dictionary (*Le Robert*) gives to the word democracy: '**Democracy**: a political doctrine, according to which sovereignty must belong to all citizens; a form of government in which the people exercise this sovereignty. **Democracy places the origin of political power in the collective will of the citizens.**'

Thus modern democracy presents itself as the combination

- of a **doctrine**, that of **popular sovereignty** (all power coming from the people)
- and of a **regime, classical democracy**, which permits a people to be (or believe themselves to be) sovereign in appointing their rulers.

For modern democracy the technique called *Classical Democracy* is not a technique among others, it is the only legitimate one; any other political technique must be eliminated because it is incompatible with the fundamental doctrine of popular sovereignty. In the genesis of modern Democracy as we will see in chapter 4 below it is the doctrine which appeared first; the regime followed as an inevitable consequence.

##### • Formulation of the Doctrine in Democratic Constitutions and in The Declarations of Rights

Given its importance one can expect to find this doctrine clearly expressed in democratic constitutions and in the Declarations of Rights associated with them. Here are some examples:

##### **The Declaration of Independence of the Thirteen United States of America of 4th July 1776:**

'(...) to guarantee these rights (inalienable from men) governments are instituted among men; they hold their just powers from the consent of the governed (...)'

##### **Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789:**

'Article 3 - the principle of all sovereignty rests essentially in the nation...

Article 6 - the law is the expression of the general will'

##### **The Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1948:**

'Article 21 - the will of the people is the foundation of the authority of the public powers'

### **Constitution of the Fifth French Republic:**

Preamble - amendment to the Declaration of 1789

*'Article 1 - France is a republic indivisible, secular, democratic and social.*

*Article 3 - national sovereignty belongs to the people.'*

- **Two Consequences of this Doctrine.**

If the principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation, this amounts to saying that no sovereignty exists other than national sovereignty.

The nation and the state which governs it will not therefore require to take account of the sovereignty of God, nor that of the Church; from which flow two consequences:

- The civil law (that voted for by Parliaments) will be established without reference to an original, transcendent divine law, natural and supernatural; it will present itself as *'the expression of the general will'* (Article 6 of the Declaration of 1789); it will have primacy over moral law of religious origin: this is the theory called juridical positivism.
- The state will no longer submit itself to the Church in doctrinal and moral matters; it will be logically separated from her.

**Juridical positivism - separation of church and state:** These two consequences of popular sovereignty result in a political and social atheism which is often glorified by the great prophets of Democracy. We cite here the testimony of Ferdinand Buisson<sup>35</sup> *'Our laws, our institutions, are not founded on the rights of God, but on the rights of man (...). They do not operate through the grace of God but in the name of the nation and with a purely human authority. Secularism is the corollary of popular sovereignty.'*

In another text Ferdinand Buisson writes: *'The man-citizen is God and there is no God other than the man-citizen.'*<sup>36</sup>

- **A Third Consequence: The abolition of those authorities whose power derives from above**

One finds in Article 3 of the Declaration of Rights of 1789 the most radical formulation of the Doctrine of popular Sovereignty: *'The principle of all sovereignty (and not only that of political sovereignty) resides essentially in the nation.'*<sup>37</sup> As Madiran comments *'I say that this Article 3 is the only dogma of the modern world; and I say that this dogma is negative because what it denies is held to be more important than what it affirms. This dogma's aim is not to establish a regime where the appointment of governments by the governed functions effectively in an absolutely legal and satisfactory manner. The main aim is negative and destructive, it is to question and to abolish all authorities which lay claim to be founded otherwise: those authorities in which power comes from on high (from the natural order and thus from the will of the Creator of nature). Modern democracy is the political translation of neither God nor master.'<sup>38</sup>*

*'The authority of a father over his family, of parents over their children, of a teacher over his pupils, the economic authority of a business leader, the professional authority of a professional body, the spiritual authority of a bishop over*

<sup>35</sup> Ferdinand Buisson (1841-1932), Protestant, one of the fathers of the secular school; he directed primary teaching from 1880 to 1896 under 27 successive Ministers.

<sup>36</sup> *La foi laïque*; quoted by Paul Courcourai in *La fin de la querelle*

<sup>37</sup> In article 21 of the Declaration of 1948, which corresponds to article 3 of the Declaration of 1789, it is not only a question of the authority of public powers. See the excerpts from the declarations given above.

<sup>38</sup> Jean Madiran. *Le Concile en question -correspondance Congar. Madiran sur Vatican II et sur la crise de L'Eglise, Itinéraires* No 296, p.109-110. Available from *Action Familiale et Scolaire*.

his diocese and that of the Pope over the Church are implicitly abolished by the dogma of Article 3 (Declaration of the Rights of 1789) (Ibid. pg.109).'

Such is also the analysis by Alain Finkielkraut, a writer of the Left, in his book: *La défaite de la pensée*: 'Even as they believed they had liberated the nation from outdated institutions which held it under their sway in fact they betrayed national identity for the sake of this illusion - this purely imaginary entity: man. When the revolutionaries invoked the nation, they did so to transfer to man the powers that the long-standing alliance of throne and altar reserve for God.'

## II Popular Sovereignty - Dogma Of The Modern World

Popular sovereignty, as Jean Madiran said, is 'the only dogma of the modern world'. We will not be astonished then to find it at the heart of numerous ideologies, often expressed under the form of a sort of religion of man, which make man an absolute.

### • Popular Sovereignty in the Ideologies of the Left and Socialism

'There is one essential value we share in common: **man must become the measure of all things**. This message which is that of Judaism, is also that of the Left.'<sup>39</sup>

'The socialist movement excludes the Christian idea which **subordinates** humanity to the ends of God, to His glory and His mysterious designs.'<sup>40</sup>

'Socialism being the **affirmation of human rights** is for that very reason the **antithesis of the Church**'.<sup>41</sup>

'We, too, lay claim to spiritual domination. We try to create something which resembles a faith, **a faith which rests on human justice and not on divine revelation**'.<sup>42</sup>

### • Popular Sovereignty in Secular and Masonic Ideologies

There is no city of God to await or to erect (...). The model of secular man, is he himself with his failings, his bravery, his worries and his boldness, his searchings and his doubts'.<sup>43</sup>

'**Man is the point of departure for all things** and all knowledge. **He is his own source and his own reference**'.<sup>44</sup>

'Freemasonry pursues the exaltation of man, the Church the exaltation of God.'<sup>45</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Pierre Mauroy, in the journal *Tribune juive*; quoted by *Tribune juive* N° 800

<sup>40</sup> Jean Jaurès, "Pages choisies", p. 224, *Revue de Paris*, 1st December 1898

<sup>41</sup> Jean Jaurès, article in *La dépêche*, 1st October 1891

<sup>42</sup> Léon Blum, speech in the Chamber of Deputies, 3rd February 1925

<sup>43</sup> Jean Andrieu, *Vous avez dit laïque*, p. 109

<sup>44</sup> Michel Baroin, former Grand Master of the Grand Orient, broadcast on Radio-France on 4th February 1979.

<sup>45</sup> Albert Lantoine, Freemason

## • Recent Formulations of the Doctrine of Popular Sovereignty

Popular sovereignty, according to the above remarks, leads to the primacy of the civil law over the moral law. This primacy has been recalled recently by politicians from all shades of the political spectrum, especially on the occasion on the publication of the Encyclical *Evangelium vitae* (25th March 1995). We already know of the declaration by Jacques Chirac, then a candidate for the presidency of the Republic and the Mayor of Paris:<sup>46</sup> ‘Yes to the voice of conscience. No to a moral law which has primacy over the civil law and which claims a place outside the law. That cannot be conceived of in a secular democracy.’<sup>47</sup>

Lionel Jospin, then First Secretary of the Socialist Party (now Prime Minister) himself echoed this in the same article in *Journal du dimanche*: ‘The Pope has recalled<sup>48</sup> the traditional position of the Church on abortion, contraception and euthanasia: that is nothing new. But he has gone much further in his encyclical in affirming the superiority of the moral law - such as he defined it - over the civil law and even advocating conscientious objection to the latter if it should contradict the former. I think that this position, which seems to me an alarming confusion of the civil and religious orders, is rather remote from the principles of a society such as ours, which is founded on secularism, the separation of Church and State and also on the values of personal liberty.’<sup>49</sup>

It is clear: for Jacques Chirac as well as Lionel Jospin our secular democracy does not permit the primacy of the moral law over the civil law. It bases itself on the opposite primacy: that of the civil law (of human origin) over the moral law (of divine origin).

More recently, in his book *Le droit au sens* which appeared in 1996, the Minister of National Education, Further Education and Research, François Bayrou forcefully reaffirmed the privileges of a sovereign people. ‘The republic, is first of all the recognition that all powers, symbolic or real come from the sovereign people. This observation may appear banal. In reality it changes the condition of the nation: we French are not only members of the French nation, we are essentially citizens. (op cit., p. 127).

And the minister defines more precisely what he means by citizen: ‘In the French mind, the citizen is first of all endowed with a collection of rights and is recognised as such, so as to emphasise that he is no longer subordinate to any authority, whatever that may be, but a free citizen in a free nation.’<sup>50</sup>

‘A citizen who is no longer subordinate to any authority whatever that might be’ is a man who makes himself God. This is truly the essence of popular sovereignty as inscribed in our constitution of 1958, in our Declaration of Rights, and in our laws.

## III. Popular Sovereignty and The Catholic Religion

### • In Fundamental Opposition

The concept of a city based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty is opposed to the Catholic concept of the city based on the doctrine of Christ the King. The opposition is profound as the table below demonstrates:

<sup>46</sup> Text quoted in *Action Familiale et Scolaire* 119 (page 21) and 120 (page 2)

<sup>47</sup> Quoted in *Le Journal du Dimanche* of 2nd April 1995

<sup>48</sup> In the encyclical *Evangelium vitae*

<sup>49</sup> Quoted in *Le Journal du dimanche* of 2nd April 1995

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, p. 128. Regarding François Bayrou’s book, *Le droit au sens*, see the article “*La laïcité correcte*” in *Action Familiale et Scolaire* N° 128 (December 1996) and in the brochure by AFS, *Vers une nouvelle religion, la laïcité*.

<b>The city founded on God</b>	<b>The city founded on man</b>
Power comes from God ( <i>omnis potestas a Deo</i> )	Power comes from man ( <i>Omnis potestas a populo</i> )
Morality is founded on the Decalogue and the Beatitudes	Morality is founded on man
Positive law is an extension of the natural and supernatural law	Positive law is an expression of the general will
Christianity and Regimes come closer together	The thousand forms of liberal and popular democracy are founded on popular sovereignty

Thus we can see that the doctrine of popular sovereignty is the antithesis of that of Christ the King.

- **Pontifical Condemnations**

Such being the case, we can understand why the Church has condemned, on many occasions, the doctrine of popular sovereignty either directly or in the doctrinal content with which it is linked (the Declaration of Rights etc.) or in relation to its consequences, juridical positivism.

### **Direct Criticism and Condemnation of the Doctrine**

*'It is not so much from a social contract but from God Himself, author of nature, of all that is good and just, that the power of Kings takes its force.'* (Pius VI, 10th March 1791)

*'Very many men of more recent times, walking in the footsteps of those who in a former age assumed to themselves the name of philosophers, say that all power comes from the people; so that those who exercise it in the state do so not as their own, but as delegated to them by the people, and that, by this rule, it can be revoked by the will of the very people by whom it was delegated. But from these Catholics dissent, who affirm that the right to rule is from God, as from a natural and necessary principle.'* (...)

*'But, as regards political power, the Church rightly teaches that it comes from God (...)*

*'On the other hand, the doctrines on political power invented by the late writers have already produced great ills amongst men, and it is to be feared that they will cause the very greatest disasters to posterity. For an unwillingness to attribute the right of ruling to God, as its author, is not less than a willingness to blot out the greatest splendour of political power and to destroy its force. And they who say that this power depends on the will of the people **err in principle** and, moreover, place authority on too weak and unstable a foundation'* (Leo XIII, encyclical *Diuturnum*, 29th June 1881.)

*'The sovereignty of the people, however, and this without any reference to God, is held to reside in the multitude, which is doubtless a doctrine exceedingly well calculated to flatter and to inflame many passions, but which lacks all reasonable proof, and all power of ensuring public safety and preserving order'* (Leo XIII, encyclical *Immortale Dei* 1st Nov. 1885)

## Condemnation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of The Citizen of 1789

*'The 17 articles on the rights of man (published by the Assembly of the Comtat venaissin, are only a faithful repetition of the declaration made by the National Assembly of France of these same rights so contrary to religion and society.'* (Pius VI, encyclical *Adeo nota*, 23rd April 1791)

## Condemnation of Juridical Positivism

Juridical Positivism we recall is the theory making the State (which is supposed to express the general will) the origin and source of all rights, the law of the State therefore becomes the supreme rule of what is right.

Condemned proposition: *'The State, as being the origin and source of all rights, is endowed with a certain right not circumscribed by any limits.'* (Pius IX, Syllabus of Errors, 8th December 1864- 39th proposition condemned.)

*'The simple fact of having been declared by the legislative power as an obligatory norm in the State, taken alone and by itself, does not create a true law. The "criterion of the simple fact" belongs only to Him who is the Author and the sovereign judge of all law, God. To apply it without distinction and definitively to the human legislator, as if it was the supreme rule of law, is the error of juridical positivism, in the true and technical sense of the word; an error which is at the root of State absolutism and equivalent to a deification of the State itself (...)*

*This "legal right"(...) considers the recognition of God as Supreme Lord, and the dependence of man upon Him as without interest to the State and the human community. This "legal right"(...) overturns the order established by the creator; it calls disorder, order; tyranny, authority; slavery, liberty; crime, patriotic virtue.'* (Pius XII Allocution to the Tribunal of the Rota, 13th November 1949)

## Pontifical Texts after the Second Vatican Council

The question of popular sovereignty has been tackled directly or indirectly in three categories of texts by John Paul II:

a. Texts recalling the obligation of the state to be guided by higher truths, to respect an objective moral law, submitting itself to the precise demands of the Decalogue (cf. *Veritatis splendor* Nos. 97 & 101, *Centesimus annus* No.46, *Evangelium vitae* Nos. 70 and 72.) which challenge the doctrine of popular sovereignty by which all power comes from the people. For example, paragraph 70 of *Evangelium vitae* states: *'Its "moral" value (Democracy's) is not automatic, but depends on conformity to the moral law to which it, like every other form of human behaviour, must be subject (...)*

*'But the value of democracy stands or falls with the values which it embodies and promotes (...)*

*The basis of these values cannot be provisional and changeable "majority" opinions, but only the acknowledgement of an objective moral law which, as the "natural law" written in the human heart, is the obligatory point of reference for civil law itself.'*

b. Texts praising the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1948, which affirmed in article 21 thereof, quoted above, the doctrine of popular sovereignty (Cf., the Address of Jean Paul II to the Assembly General of the United Nations, 2nd October 1979.)



c. Constant references to the Conciliar Declaration on Religious Liberty, article 6 of which presents the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of religion. This principle practically forbids the State to submit itself to the Decalogue and to make its legislation conform to it, because by so doing it would favour the Catholic religion (which alone integrally respects the Decalogue).

Is it possible to render these teachings compatible with one another? We find these difficulties in other fields and this is one of the aspects of the doctrinal crisis in the Church.

- **Catholics are persecuted unless they are Liberals**

The State born of popular sovereignty - and thus separated from the Church and non-submissive to her moral and doctrinal authority - presents itself as *'a neutral State as far as religion is concerned, is tolerant of all cults, and forces the Church to obey it on this cardinal point.'*<sup>51</sup>

It *'forces the Church to obey it.'* In other words it will persecute Her if She obstinately defends doctrines (such as those of Christ the King in particular) which are incompatible with the doctrine upon which the State is founded. It will tolerate The Church if her representatives wisely show their liberal credentials. This attitude - a mix of enslavement, tolerance of those who accept subjugation, and persecution of others - is the same as that employed by the French Republic from its origins.

*'According to the maxims of the Assembly, if, under the secular State, beliefs and cults are free, under the sovereign State, Churches are subjects.'*<sup>52</sup>

- **Liberal Catholics - Christian Democracy**

Despite the fundamental opposition which has just been pointed out between the doctrine of popular sovereignty, the soul of modern democracy, and the doctrine of Christ the King, a certain number of Catholics have, from the time of the revolutionary epoch, put all their political hopes on democracy; they believe that the evolution of peoples towards democratic institutions corresponds to the projection of Christian principles into modern life; it is they who in turn gave rise to the current ideas of Catholic liberalism which persist in the various movements presenting themselves as Christian democracies.

Certain aspects of Christian Democracy are described in Annexe I.

#### **IV Origin of the Doctrine of Popular Sovereignty**

- **Religious Subjectivism and Political Subjectivism**

The doctrine of popular sovereignty is, in essence, only subjectivism applied to the field of politics. *'Subjectivism is a doctrine which questions everything that exists whether it be reality or values independent of the cognitive being... ("Man", said Protagoras, "is the measure of all things.")'*<sup>53</sup> Subjectivism exists when the subject does not recognise any truth independent of himself, nor any transcendent power: this is exactly the position with the doctrine of popular sovereignty which challenges the existence of a power greater than the people.

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<sup>51</sup> E Renan, in a reply to the reception speech of Pasteur, 27th April 1882; quoted by Le Robert in describing *'laïcité'*.

<sup>52</sup> Taine, *Origines de la France contemporaine*, III t.I p. 278; quoted by Le Robert on the subject of *'laïcité'*. The Assembly mentioned here is the Constituent Assembly.

<sup>53</sup> Definition given in the vocabulary of philosophy by R Jolivet

Subjectivism developed in Christian countries in the wake of Luther. Thus we find similarities between the religious subjectivism of the Reformation and the political subjectivism of modern democracy. Let us examine two of the most obvious examples of this:

- **From Luther to Kant to 1789**

With his theory of self-illumination,<sup>54</sup> Luther necessarily arrived at religious subjectivism. Next came Kant 'who did no more than transpose into the practical order the supernatural subjectivism of his master, Luther.'<sup>55</sup> From which came moral subjectivism according to which, 'Conscience owes nothing to anything but itself; it is its own rule, its own law, its own sanction, its own supreme tribunal.'<sup>56</sup>

Then came the Freemasons whose Declaration of the Rights of Man<sup>57</sup> introduced into the political order the subjectivism which had remained religious with Luther, and moral with Kant: there is no transcendent order in politics, all that counts is the general will of the citizens, of which law is the expression.

In his book, *La démocratie religieuse*, Charles Maurras has identified the forebear of these three forms of subjectivism (what he calls "individualisms")

*'To teach the individual to derive his own rule from himself, the attempt was made first to deliver him from all laws which did not come directly from him. The "exterior" law is nothing but an immoral constraint: we can thus thole it but cannot accept it - it is the interior law which alone merits the name of moral law, it is subjective to each individual and is self-imposed, it dishonours and annuls itself as soon as it makes an appeal to any authority but its own.*

*This methodical revolt against the rules corresponds to the exaltation of the interior god. All prohibitions, all impositions or limits being treated as hostile if they do not measure up to a conscience which having received them, examines them, and establishes that they emanate from 'outside' (Religion, Society, Family or State). On the contrary, worry, qualms, nervous tension, troubles or upsets, whatever the cause, will be considered sympathetically.*

*This exclusive and deliberate cult of individual spontaneity, together with the disdain for everything else, must be labelled with its true name, individualism.*

*If we set out again and compare the names of things, we can better understand the relationships between them: Religious individualism is called the Reformation or private interpretation, political individualism is called the Revolution; individualism in art is Romanticism. **All these in truth amount to the same thing.**'<sup>58</sup>*

- **The Influence of Ramus**

From the sixteenth century Protestants have adopted the doctrine of popular sovereignty. Such was the case of the French philosopher, Ramus (1515-1572) who was the founder of the Congregationalist branch of Protestantism.<sup>59</sup> Besides the relationship which we have already described (From Luther - Kant and Rousseau - the Masonic ideology and the Rights of Man 1789) we can trace the existence of an even more direct relationship following the line of Ramus' ideas.

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<sup>54</sup> See the Apropos Study Document *The Rudiments of Protestantism* by Arnaud de Lassus

<sup>55</sup> E Julien, *Bossuet et les protestants*, p. 324

<sup>56</sup> ditto

<sup>57</sup> On the masonic origin of the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789, see the Brochure by AFS. *Connaissance élémentaire de la franc-maçonnerie* p. 23.

<sup>58</sup> Charles Maurras, *La démocratie religieuse*, p. 238; M de Lassus' emphasis.

<sup>59</sup> Congregationalism: 'a system in which each Protestant parish is autonomous' (*Petit Robert*)

Ramus had based his social and religious system on the theory of three pacts: the pact of the Church, the pact of grace and the social pact, according to which power came from the people.

Ramus' ideas were adopted by the English Puritans (Cromwell) then by the American Puritans; they impressed Jefferson when he drew up the Declaration of Independence of the thirteen English colonies in America on 4th July 1776: they returned to France when this declaration became known and served as a model and inspiration for the Freemasons and revolutionaries of 1789.

Thus the Protestant Ramus may be considered as one of the fathers of the doctrine of popular sovereignty such as it was put into practice amongst us.<sup>60</sup>

“One of the fathers”, we said: the relationships between ideas are complex and generally come into effect in many ways.

### • The Judgement of Leo XIII

Many pontifical texts have underlined the importance of the relationship between the Reformation and modern democracy such as this one by Leo XIII: *‘From this heresy (the Reformation) there arose in the last century a false philosophy - a new right as it is called, popular sovereignty together with an unbridled licence which many regard as the only true liberty.’* ( *Diuturnum* 29th June 1881).

In our epoch of when Catholicism is being protestantised, this teaching merits being known and meditated upon.

### Conclusion of The Second Part

Christ the King or popular sovereignty: In politics, this is the modern equivalent of the combat between those two standards which St Ignatius spoke about in his Spiritual Exercises (in more secular terms we can speak of this as opposition between the Revolution and the Counter Revolution).<sup>61</sup>

The matter is at the same time doctrinal and practical: we must be faithful to a principle and fight in the right camp.

Alas many Catholics have challenged the principle which was theirs and have chosen the wrong camp, sometimes without suspecting it. Why have they abandoned this doctrine? They have done so because the doctrine of Christ the King was little known in the past and is known even less now, because for thirty years it has been eclipsed in the name of the conciliar doctrine on religious liberty.<sup>62</sup>

It is essential thus to react first of all in the doctrinal field, for the salvation of souls is at stake, because as Pius XII said, *‘Upon the form we give to society, either in conformity with or against the Divine Law, depends and proceeds the good or ill of souls.’*<sup>63</sup>

<sup>60</sup> On the life, ideas and influence of Ramus, see the article by Jacques Mariès “*Ramus, un philosophe inconnu*” in N° 20 of *Sel de la Terre*.

<sup>61</sup> *‘Meditation on two standards, one that of Jesus Christ, Our Sovereign Leader and Lord; the other that of Satan, the mortal enemy of human nature.’*

<sup>62</sup> Cf. the brochure by AFS *La liberté religieuse, trente ans après Vatican II*.

<sup>63</sup> Speech for the 50th anniversary of *Rerum Novarum*, 11th June 1941.

## THE THIRD PART

### The Democratic Apparatus

#### (The technique of “philosophical-societies” and of an organising nucleus)

##### Introduction<sup>64</sup>

- **The Advent of Democracy, its Ideology and Participants**

When we study a phenomenon like democracy, it is essential to state facts and to analyse the logic of ideas. It is also important to answer the question ‘How does it work, that is, to study how the coming of democracy and its ideology and participants are connected and co-exist.

To explain all in terms of ideology is to risk reducing a social phenomenon to the activity of some philosophers or thinkers. To explain everything in terms of the participants is to risk reducing history to a plot or conspiracy. Such would not take account of the collective impregnation by democracy which has taken place in the modern world.

It is necessary, however, to begin by analysis of this ideology, particularly its anti-natural aspect. Individualism, egalitarianism and liberalism are in effect the antithesis of the common good, which is the final cause of society. We see in these a reversal of the natural order. But to reverse the natural order, by its very definition is not so easy. That this ideology is able to go so far in conditioning each and every one of us does not simply arise from reading Rousseau. The investigation into how the event, the ideology and the participants co-exist is what we mean by the “social machine” or “apparatus” which makes modern democracy a “type of society”.

- **Bibliographical References**

We will depend heavily upon Augustin Cochin’s analysis of the apparatus of the French Revolution. Cochin<sup>65</sup> is an essential reference in this field. His tragic death in 1916 interrupted a work which, it was said, would have become the indisputable history of the French Revolution. We will also refer to the book by François Furet<sup>66</sup> in *Penser la Révolution française* and notably chapter 3 of the second part entitled ‘Augustin Cochin: la théorie du jacobinisme’. François Furet rightly emphasises that Cochin discerned the central mystery of the

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<sup>64</sup> Further on the text includes some large extracts from Cochin and Furet. To render the text more manageable, certain arrangements in the form and some transitions have been added. The quotations have not all been placed in inverted commas.

<sup>65</sup> Born in 1876, he died in battle in 1916. He was a philosopher and Catholic historian. The bulk of his work was published by his friends and family. His death interrupted his principal work which it has been impossible to put together. Some parts, however, have been reassembled in *La Révolution et la libre pensée (1924)*. Some notes, often very brief, were also collected under the title *Abstractions révolutionnaires et réalisme catholique* (Desclée de Brouwer). Several speeches and articles have been brought together under the title *Les sociétés de Pensée et la Démocratie moderne*. It is this version which we use in this chapter (éditions Copernic, 1978) It is available from AFS.

<sup>66</sup> Contemporary historian, entered the Académie française in 1997. His book *Penser la Révolution française* was edited by éditions Gallimard (1978). His thesis rests on the analyses of Cochin and de Tocqueville, ‘the only historians, he said, to put forward a rigorous conceptualisation of the French Revolution and to have dealt with the question put forward in this book.’

French Revolution which is the origin of democracy. A synthesis of Cochin has been reprinted in the December 1994 issue of the review *Permanences*.

In the third part we will refer to Augustin Barruel and his *'Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire du jacobinisme'* (re-edited by DPF). Finally we will use the book by A. Loubier *'Groups réducteurs et noyaux dirigeants'* <sup>67</sup> and the illustration from it which will introduce this fourth part.

- **How to create the Democratic Spirit**

Adrien Loubier reproduces, then analyses an extract from a parish newspaper of May 1968 reproduced by the newspaper *Témoignage chrétien*:

**'Today there is no homily, that's how things began on Sunday 19th May. Some parishioners expressed to one another their astonishment and regret, that faced with these events, the clergy team should have remained silent.**

*These parishioners (about 20 including many young people) decided to meet together at the house of a militant from "New Life," a former group leader well known in the parish. Moreover they invited some friends to join them.*

*The discussion, which began with the events of May, gradually turned upon the parish itself and upon the conviction that there was no longer any community life.*

*A parishioner who had already made an attempt at renewal along with several others, put forward the draft of a sort of constitution which would permit everyone to exercise their parochial "citizenship" and form a true community.*

*(...)*

*Masters of the art of calling everything in question, and with an intellectual capacity which would leave some of us bewildered, the team got to the nub of the problem - that to enable full participation it was necessary to abandon traditional models of authority and thus develop a fraternal relationship which would allow all to participate.*

*A date, the 9th of June, was chosen. The day would develop as it had in preceding gatherings comprising an open forum in the Church with Mass at the end of the morning, then lunch, and then the forum continuing in the afternoon. A text was prepared as an introduction to this 'day of questioning and friendship'...*

*(...)*

*On Saturday evening the chairs in the Church were rearranged into an amphitheatre. We tried out roving microphones and finally, for the final debates, installed a banner carrying the words 'The Church is all of us' ...*

*Serious discussion then began, even if at first what was aired did not get to the root of the problem: the liturgy, the catechism, the catechesis of adults, the parish newsletter were all questioned, but also the dichotomy between daily life and the expression of the faith was raised....*

*Our relationship with priests, their state of life, the difficulties of maintaining the community, the need for lay participation in the development of the parish, all these were discussed in an attentive and emotionally-charged atmosphere which was often overwhelming....*

*Debate was informal: despite the desire of some to set up a commission. The necessity for a collective outpouring of feelings and an examination of conscience was widely felt.*

*(...)*

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<sup>67</sup> *Édition Sainte Jeanne d'Arc* (1979)

Finally, all of us prepared the homily which would be delivered by our parish priest. The final prayer: each spontaneously voiced his intentions, the atmosphere was unique, the Spirit had truly blown where He willed.

(...)

### **By way of a provisional conclusion:**

- what was accomplished could not have occurred by more conventional means.
- we had probably not managed to plumb the psychological depths of certain attitudes. It is easy to free oneself from a conception of power and authority which has been forged by morals which come from afar.

### • **Commentary**

After having reproduced this report published in *Témoignage chrétien*, A Loubier quotes from this letter which he wrote to the local Bishop about these assemblies:

*'One thing seems evident: the movement was far from reaching unanimity. Part of the parish finds itself subjected to a power which develops itself along the following lines:*

- *either you come and play according to the rules of the game that we have chosen and which have been approved by the Committee of Thirty;*
- *or you do not come, in which case you have nothing much to say.*

*In what follows I have decided to restrict myself to some important observations which I feel compelled to make.*

### **The Questioning of all doctrinal teaching (liberalism)**

*A flood of words and disparate contrasting and opposing interventions, tended progressively to make reality disappear from sight. The very idea of the existence of objective truths taught by the Church was cast aside little by little. The effect is to make people accustomed to hearing the most diverse range of personal views, and to induce the conviction that everything that is said is not, and cannot be, anything more than the private opinion of the person who expresses it. If anyone supports his position by quoting doctrines this results immediately in a call to order: it was agreed not to make reference to the hierarchy...and, if need be, protests ring out: we don't care a hoot for Tradition... the Magisterium: it doesn't matter to us..*

*Consequently, the only criterion that is accepted is majority opinion, on the things that concern the members of the group, what the rank and file thinks, what it supports.*

### **Questioning of all hierarchies (egalitarianism)**

*Besides, at the very beginning of the meeting, a reminder was given by a priest that according to the rules of the game, which we had accepted, it had been agreed that they would never bring up the question of the Bishops or the Pope or the hierarchy of the Church: We would avoid all reference to these so that everyone could express himself freely.*

*Thus we found an assembly constituted without any structure and without any responsibility, under the direction of an animator whose appointment the participants were called upon to ratify. The impression was that of a confused amalgamation in which cleric and layman, believer and unbeliever, young and old met together to confront, call in question and remake the Church.*

### **Manipulation of the group (a directing nucleus)**

Some elementary psychological techniques were brought into play by an animator from a socio-cultural-professional background whom the assembly thought they had appointed to arrange debates.

The style of the meeting: the arrangement of people in a circle; the apparently unassuming role of the animator which in fact was a determining role; the blackboard with its summaries of interventions; the animators judiciously distributed throughout the room; the vagueness generated in minds as a result of the succession of interventions; the subject chosen by the community, understood in the sense of the emerging communitarian will - all this made the manipulation of the group almost natural.

It was easy to develop a constraining atmosphere of relativism after having quelled all support for reference to objective criteria and having erased from people's minds that way of thinking. This, together with the technique of depersonalising individuals through group dynamics made the desired, progressive fusion of wills not too difficult.

We can thus anticipate the sequel.

After the impact of the beginning, habits developed; first reactions became subdued, opponents were identified little by little, they were won round or eliminated; a de facto authority was created.

Being convinced that such assemblies take exactly the opposite course from the serious and positive work which it is important to develop in service of the Church and Christ, I decided to react, as did some twenty others, by leaving the assembly, thus breaking up this patently false fraternity.

But everyone did not take the same approach and some were motivated by the best of intentions. This was the case with Madame N, also cited by A Loubier:

*'What happened? She had arrived armed with arguments in defence of the truth. That is to say, she had concentrated all her energies on these ideas without taking account of the way things were being orientated. They told her, "Madam we respect your point of view very much. It is your opinion. We ask nothing more than that you respect those of others also". She accepted these rules of the game in the hope of convincing them, without recognising that she was being taken down a path which leads to absorption. She had one finger in the mesh, she had taken the basic step towards being muzzled; **liberalism**.*

*Thus she could only accept the logical sequence of this, the second basic step, **equality**. "Madam, this person does not think like you. That is her right. If you wish her to listen to you, you must let her express herself. Isn't her opinion as valuable as yours?"*

*What should be done? If you appear intransigent will you not lose this hope which still dangles before you; of saving at least a "part" of the truth? And in the middle of this welter of advice, opinions, and questioning, how can you not feel "concern". Mustn't we all be **brothers**? And if this group must develop some pointers for catechesis, how can this woman possibly avoid participating in the work in the hope of saving a little truth in all this hotchpotch?*

*From then onwards, Madame N had more than one finger in the mesh. She had both her arms in it; and the rest of her followed. In short, she has defeated herself. But it is essential to see that it was because she applied her efforts to no avail. It was because she chased after illusions and dreams that she fell into the pit.*

No, not illusions about the importance of modernist catechisms but rather concerning the belief that it is possible to struggle effectively against them by accepting the sociological means by which they are propagated. In the fight for truth, it is the alleged object of these types of gatherings that deceive the imprudent.(...)

However, as for the revolutionary transformation of people, their behaviour and their morals, it is the form of reductive group which matters. As for ideas these will necessarily become confused as long as the person remains within the system.

## I - A New Political Sociability

Cochin's merit lies in his demonstration of the mechanism of the phenomenon illustrated above. He found it in the French Revolution which he analysed in its central mystery, in which, as we said in quoting Furet, lies the origin of modern democracy.

Cochin saw in the birth of this modern democracy, and more particularly in Jacobinism in 1793, the finished form of a type of political and social organisation which spread throughout France in the second half of the 18th century which he called **"the philosophical-society"** (*"la société de pensée"*); a society which manifested itself in these ways, among others: circles, salons, literary societies, lodges, clubs. We may think that he was making this observation directly about Freemasonry. His analysis however was directed at all of our society.

### • What is a Philosophical-Society

First of all, it is an organisation in which the members take up their roles as members divested of their concrete characteristics, experience, competence, and real social standing. They do not constitute a society bound by common interests, professional or social, a community united in the defence or promotion of a common good<sup>68</sup> : such gatherings appeal to experts guided by a "leader". What makes a person the citizen of a city, is his place and thus his responsibility within that city.

Conversely, none of that applies in a *philosophical-society*. What makes citizens citizens as such is the share they have in sovereignty. It is their relationship with the idea of equality which is fashioned into an abstract right (abstract because exercised without reference to responsibilities). This "mystique" is translated into the rules of a game, the basic principles of which are liberty and equality: each must be free to speak when he wishes; no prejudice, rejection of all taboos, no norms, no objective laws, no morals, no dogma, no truth; they sit around a round table to mark the absence of hierarchy. In such a concept liberty and equality are in some way reciprocal.

However, whatever this liberty may be, we cannot deny that there is, in fact, rigorous discipline - indeed real unity - between all those small "societies" which go from Catholic action groups<sup>69</sup> - assemblies of parents of school-children, of women catechists, to party-political cells, or more simply secular-gatherings. In all of them we find the same spirit, the same methods, the same means of discussion, apparently platonic, indeed the same themes.

The apparatus has thus the means to impose itself. But it is important to ask in whose name it is imposed. None, replies Cochin and there lies the marvel of the affair. What provides a structure to this apparatus is the

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<sup>68</sup> It might start by bringing together some men with common problems, but this is only a convenient pretext to bring individuals together to discuss vague or remote problems. Some groups such as meetings of catechists discussing peace in Nicaragua or the good of mankind, very often function in the manner of philosophical-societies.

<sup>69</sup> See part IV which follows later



very absence of structure, it is the negation of all faith and of all rules. And its followers boast of it as if it were an emancipation, whereas this “church” with neither credo nor soul is a mere phantom which has succeeded in throttling a whole real society.

And Cochin here draws a first conclusion (which is imperfect - but we will return to that <sup>70</sup>): Democracy is not a spirit which defines itself by its aim, nor a tendency which explains itself by its end but an intellectual phenomenon resulting necessarily and unconsciously from certain material conditions of relationship. The “moral” comes to be explained by reference to the “social” (life lived together). Cochin compares this approach with those which place the Church before Christ. It only remains to show how this assertion against nature, of a cart placed before the horse, can be other than absurd... since we can see it function.

It is therefore necessary to analyse how ideas and men are fabricated, ideas upon which consensus is reached, and the men who peddle them.

- **Reaching consensus - the soul of the system**

We must start first of all with the activity which occurs in all these cogs, meetings, associations which we gather under the title “*philosophical-societies*”. This can be summed up in a single phrase: we talk. This point is of major importance: they are there to talk and not to do, it is a co-operative of ideas, a laboratory of thought - but not a laboratory in the normal sense of the term. One talks about oneself ( and in thus exposing publicly what makes up one’s personality one becomes very vulnerable) and each mind seeks, on the one hand to listen, and, on the other hand, to gain the assent of all and obtain the opinion of everybody. One does not think, one “repeats” to bring out a common opinion (what is called a platform, a consensus (an essential word) which will be expressed and defended. The *philosophical-society* is an instrument to construct a unanimous opinion. Socialised truth ( because it is born from society) which comes out of the particular chemistry of these assemblies is not thought: It is consensus (we may perhaps note here that - as it is properly thought out - the ideology renders all criticism difficult and accepts contradictory propositions). Consensus serves as the bond for this disaggregated society of individuals, a very loose bond because reduced to a minimum and above all to an abstraction. While in the real world thought is put to the test of proof and experience; here the judge is the opinion of others. Members are subject to a point of view other than that found in the real world. This point of view is opinion, the new “Queen of the world” (Voltaire). What a thing is depends on opinion, what is real is what others see, what is true is what they say, good what they approve. The natural order is reversed, opinion is not the effect but the cause. Seeming takes the place of being, and saying the place of doing. Law, obedience and respect have no place here. Man is sufficient in himself and in his reason, will and instincts; this chimera takes the place of dogma, *laisser-faire* takes the place of law.

- **The “fabrication” of men**

In the real world it is evident that the moralist without faith, the politician without tradition, the man without experience are doomed to failure. But we are not living in the real world. We leave that world outside when we spend a few hours playing the “*philosophical-society*” game. Here, there is only talking and talking to others. Success goes to the idea which is talked about and not to the fruitful idea which can be verified. You are free not to enter into this new combination but, if you do enter, you are not entitled to express your mind other than in the way allowed by the rules of the game. Any other attitude will be put down as chauvinism, egoism or clericalism.

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<sup>70</sup> Later on we say that Cochin’s “machine” requires to be completed by Barruel’s conspirators.

You must leave outside all that serves you in the real world and which here would be embarrassing, ridiculous, or odious; you must leave it in the cloakroom and retrieve it on leaving. You go to play at democracy and leave to return thereafter to real life.

It is therefore a game but one not without consequences. The motions produced or the ideas sketched out may only have little importance, but people's way of thinking has been modified. Their minds have been diverted from present and future reality, and now operate only in the domain of the ideal. And, the game goes on; some play better than others: the untrained young, lawyers, writers or speakers, sceptics, the vain, the superficial. These take a liking to it, their deficiencies become their strengths. A nice career offers itself to them. Real minds are disorientated, they have nothing to do there, they eliminate themselves: a mechanical selection, an automatic purging, sorting... The others are now much safer from any realistic objections. The more the company present is reduced to the zealots, the more intense their domination becomes. They are selected and swept along by a law which operates wherever the social phenomenon of a *philosophical-society* model is found. Each one conforms to it as rigidly and unconsciously as the other.

*'Purging and intimidation: this is the double social law which must be kept in mind. It promotes the advent of an intellectual and moral type which nobody had foreseen, each person would condemn and yet all are preparing.'* The progress of these ideas is truly a social phenomenon, one is united here to make the truth and not by the truth; a subconscious phenomenon in which one does not even need to know the rules in order to play the game. The subject enters into society, voices his opinion, discusses things - that is enough. Society does the rest of the "work" (work in the sense of "fermentation"). Society ignores its law, that's what allows it to declare itself free; it is "orientated" without knowing it ("orientated" - "Grand Orient"), the name adopted in 1770 and not "led"; its work is regeneration of the individual.

Society is to the citizen what grace is to the Christian. The interior voice, Rousseau had said, is only formed through the habit of judging and feeling in the cradle of society and according to its laws.

The member thus becomes more and more attached to the society which has formed him. He is only apparently free; paradoxically, society holds him to this false liberty as if it by a fetter. We will call this "Civisme", a powerful bond which has the lustre of virtue. Civisme serves the community; it is the explanation of the strange fraternity which attaches more than it unites. Charity unites men through the love of God, fraternal solidarity unites them through the intermediary of the collective will. As the society shapes the intelligence of its followers, it takes over their wills.

- **Conclusion**

The *philosophical-society* constitutes the matrix of a new political relationship, and the democratic relationship creates a new political sociability structured about the individual and no longer on institutional bodies. A world founded on this confused thing which calls itself public opinion. We may therefore call it "democratic sociability" since the lines of communication are formed at the level of a society where one man equals another.

## **II - From the "small society" to political Society**

- **Reality is born from Illusion.**

We are disconcerted at seeing all these little societies at ease, in the clouds, in abstract speech, in dialogue without reference to externals, and in the realm of unreality, impose themselves or at least their methods on

political society as a whole. Cochin shows that, for this purpose, the system possesses something better than the ordinary means of propaganda: he shows that, thanks to the union of these societies without leaders or dogmas,<sup>71</sup> the system has the capacity to set in motion a false opinion more vociferous, more unanimous and more universal than the true one, and hence more truthful in the eyes of the public.

All these “little societies”, all these little circles of micro-democracy, are formed like a claque in the theatre, paid to applaud and prime the applause of the crowd. It is by the intimidation of the whole of this claque that the system carries out its dirty work; it is not like demagoguery, engaging flashy scenery and actor’s tricks. This claque, comprising the personnel from the societies, is so well trained, that it really believes in its function, that it becomes sincere, and so well distributed throughout the room, that each is unaware of the others, and every one of the spectators considers the claque as members of the public. It gives the impression of an extensive and united groundswell of opinion. Each person submits to what he thinks everybody supports. From this illusion of reality, reality is born. Thus without talents, without risks, these little societies make public opinion according to their taste.

There is still a link missing from this chain which drives the social machine. We cannot discern any authority, deriving from man or doctrine, and our presentation tends to show that theoretically the process can turn over thus as long as it remains in its own sphere, in the clouds and outside reality. As soon as it comes into contact with the questions of the real world, anarchy must find order again and, paradoxically, finds it under two forms: unity of direction and unity of opinion.

- **Directing Nuclei and Unity of Direction**

We have already spoken about the law of selection and training. “*The purging mechanism is consubstantial with pure democracy*”. It acts little by little. And then of course we must recognise that in these small societies only a small number are effective members: 100 registered, 30 present, 5 effective and these determine what the society does. Some write on behalf of the others, after all not everyone is cut out to hold the secretary’s post, nor able to find the requisite formula which is called upon to synthesise the thinking of this little group which has organised itself without the knowledge of the greater number and sometimes even, at the start, of those who will be its supporters. The apparatus has put in place “secretly” a directing nucleus.

Thus there is formed, in the midst of the society, a much smaller one, more active and more united... Each time the society meets, they have seen their friends beforehand, settled on their plan, given their orders, encouraged the lukewarm, influenced the timid. The meeting is certainly free, but this freedom leaves little to chance: it is the freedom of a locomotive on rails. This system is what Freemasons call the system of orders or interior circles. A system according to which all permanent social groups and all people, are “profane” from the point of view of a more limited group of initiates. The examples of this are numerous - the organisation of political parties in particular frequently furnish illustrations.

It is important to see that we have before us a particular method of exercising authority; the interior circle does not have power; It works, but this work does not presuppose the moral influence of a leader. Its power lies elsewhere. It orientates more than it directs and the orientation descends step by step by all the organisms of the parallel hierarchies. It is through these methods that what is accomplished is so astonishing: “a social order maintained without infringing anarchic principles, an orthodoxy founded without faith, a discipline established without loyalty.” And as this applies to a society of individuals, so too it applies to a society of societies.

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<sup>71</sup> i.e. without “visible” masters and without “apparent” dogmas.

It is necessary to dwell on this aspect of the mechanics of operation, even if it is incomplete. Conscious of the role of the interior circle, Gambetta proclaimed “*Now we know that universal suffrage is we ourselves*”, and Cochin comments: it is true, they are universal suffrage, only it is not necessary for them to know it and pass the word around. They are the necessary products not the authors. Once the society has been established, an inner circle is inevitably formed and directs it without this being realised. Where liberty reigns, in the revolutionary sense of the term, it is the machine which governs.

The society “fabricates” this anonymous oligarchy, a group of obscure, mediocre men who succeed one another and can be changed around. Brissot, Danton, Robespierre are not so much Jacobin leaders as Jacobin products. Provisional instruments, these manipulators are only cogs themselves.<sup>72</sup>

- **Unity of Opinion**

When he analyses unity of opinion, Cochin brings out the importance of the correspondence between the parent societies and their subsidiaries. This is what remains of the truth, he says, in this abundant correspondence after repeated expurgations. Silence and propaganda can only be manipulated on a national scale by the machine, only it has the means to do so (Cochin cites numerous examples: p.102, 103, 104). An opinion-forming power cannot be brought to bear without the mediation of societies of the genre of “*philosophical-societies*”. It would need to be shown how today the mass media are perfect players in the “*philosophical-society*” phenomenon, and add greatly to its success. An efficient lever to create “orthodox” opinion is the accomplished fact, as we have already recalled. What has been agreed upon by some is used to put pressure on others to adopt it. This snowballs, carrying one along with the others, and those who put up any opposition are told, “You will be the only ones to resist”.

- **Secrecy Essential**

Unity of direction, unity of opinion; inner circle, *fait accompli*.

Undoubtedly this way of working requires secrecy: secrecy among the directing group, first of all, and, much later, towards outsiders. Secrecy is an integral part of government by “orientation”.

Let’s be quite clear: this is not a case of mystification or esotericism here, don’t deceive yourself. An opinion cannot impose itself as being that of everyone unless it is believed to be supported by absolutely everyone. To pull strings one must hide them. The hired clappers must be dispersed among the audience. If a signature is displayed once...the mechanism ceases to function. The new power perishes merely by becoming known; in democracy the fact conforms to the principle: There is no master -visible- under this regime which issues no direct commands: “There is in all democratic power, a fortiori in all pure democratic power, a hidden oligarchy, at the same time contrary to its principles and indispensable to its functioning.” ... (F Furet, op. cit., p. 241).

Everybody knows, says Marcel de Corte, that contemporary democracy is the false face which disguises the oligarchies which govern us. Their theories and principles on which their artificial union is based (a union on ideology, a union without purpose), are only a holed and tattered blanket covering the activities of pressure groups at work in present-day society. We particularly have in mind the activities of globalist groups.

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<sup>72</sup> F Furet, *Penser la Révolution française*, p. 228-229.

### III - Modern democracy: its agents

We have just studied a mechanism which, we repeat simplifies the political fabric which constitutes democracy. Furet emphasises on his part, that 'the term "machine" suggests a sort of perfect mechanical organisation which is, in large measure, a myth' ( op. cit., p. 255).

However it seems impossible to understand our epoch if one does not comprehend the nature of what it is that can subjugate the human heart, a whole people, something which directs the modern world and upon which television has conferred increased power. Those who neglect the importance of this democratic socialisation will inevitably come to grief on it. The French once thought like Bossuet; they awoke one morning thinking like Voltaire. (P. Hazard). This did not happen spontaneously. It explains nothing to say that something is in the wind. The uniformity and conformism which characterise our democratic societies, and the development of secularism are the products of the machine.

- **Freemasonry**

By itself this machine does not explain everything. Augustin Barruel <sup>73</sup> has shown the role of secret societies in the genesis of the French Revolution by emphasising that the Freemasons had acted in concert to set up the revolutionary machine. This is what is called the conspiracy theory. Cochin's thesis affirming: '*Barruel was not wrong but he explained nothing because he began at the end.*' is incorrect. Barruel did begin at the end and the explanation he gave must necessarily complement Cochin's, which, without it, would have remained very theoretical. It would have presupposed a spontaneous generation of *philosophical-societies*, which is highly unlikely. Without occult masters and of dogmas elaborated at a high level and suggested from above, the unity of *philosophical-societies* which Cochin found could not have been realised. And if Freemasonry has become as effective as we can see today, the reason is that it represents the system analysed by Cochin and Barruel in its most refined form. The Lodges apply the working principles of the machine described by Cochin:

**Liberty** conceived as a total absence of bonds or ties to an immutable truth or a transcendent order - such is the nature of "free thought" which recognises no order, natural or supernatural.

**Equality**, an association of equals aiming to bring into general use (internally as well as externally) the basic principle of modern democracy.

**Fraternity** but here it is a question of a very demanding fraternity implying submission to general opinion or siding with the consensus. But freemasonry carried out this amazing feat of observing principles which were tantamount to anarchy, all the while maintaining an extremely firm and necessarily occult structure which introduced an unseen subjection to the unknown leaders of this game. It is here that the contribution of Barruel and Cochin is indispensable. Cochin thought that the machine itself was sufficient to bring about the emergence of directing nuclei. The process of triage, selection and automatic elimination were for him sufficient to create a unity of direction and opinion. And it is true that this process has been little studied and is little known among most people; but it is strengthened when the sifting, the selection is helped by the deliberate choice of those who incorporate this chain of inner circles into a hierarchy, each ascending level of which has an increasingly complete knowledge of the objectives; and this hierarchy proceeds by way of "orientation", not by command, in the recognised sense of the term.

Concerning the choice of men, Copin-Albancelli, a Freemason, who left Freemasonry, describes the approach made to him at the time he was thinking of leaving: '*One of the more influential men, not a politician, but a Mason,*

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<sup>73</sup> A Jesuit (1741-1820), author of *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire du Jacobinisme* (Re-edited by DPF)

had proposed to meet me and he advised me that what he was about to say to me would be a matter of extreme importance. He began by asking me to keep secret the conversation he was going to have with me. Then he told me: You can judge the power of freemasonry; and yet you are also in a position to realise the mediocrity of those who are engaged in it. We are all-powerful, not because freemasons are more intelligent, more skilful or better instructed than the common herd - you know that is not so - but because we are organised. The country is unaware of our organisation and our aims. As a result we are able to act without this being suspected by our fellow-countrymen and, consequently, without their opposing our action. There lies the secret of our strength. But let's suppose that instead of an association of 25,000 nobodies, there existed another association which numbered only 1,000, but which would never admit a new member without having studied him and followed him for a period of years, creating around him the most diverse circumstances with the aim of testing him, and raising up difficulties against which, by the strength of his efforts, he could give the measure of his intelligence and will. Suppose such an association, by recruiting in this way, only chose members such as those of whom it was able to say that they were of one mind, one heart, one body. What strength would such an association have?' I replied, naturally, that such an association would be the mistress of the world. Then after repeating that what I was about to hear must for ever remain a secret between us, my interlocutor said, 'Very well, this association exists and I am authorised to allow you to enter it, should you wish. (Page 71-72).

Such is the Masonic technique; an inferior secret society - inferior by virtue of its position and its quality, is directed, unbeknown to it, by another superior secret society which is itself directed in the same manner.'<sup>74</sup>

We can therefore finish here with freemasonry by underlining that its effectiveness for the universal adoption of modern democracy is undeniable. Marcel de la Bigne Villeneuve made this observation concerning this dogma of modern democracy: 'Every individual is free and sovereign by nature and by essence. The sovereignty of the people is (...) the consequence of these individual sovereignties (...). It is diametrically opposed to the Christian notion of power. It necessarily ends up with the elimination of God, who is driven out of the city by the revolt of man inspired by the infernal spirit.'<sup>75</sup>

#### • Relay Groups

The lodges furthermore try hard to transform or set up, through philosophical-societies, groups which might act as relays for them 'And, in fact, innumerable groups may be considered as "philosophical-societies" (the innumerable groups whether trade unions, parliaments, administrative councils, Catholic action groups, councils of parents of schoolchildren, or of trainees subject to group dynamics) whenever liberal procedures apply (freedom of thought) or democratic procedures (where all members are equal and submit themselves in a fraternity to the common opinion of the group). It suffices that some members of the group are remotely controlled by Freemasons for manipulation by unknown leading spirits to be put into operation and thus constitute an excellent transmission device for freemasonry.

Thus, the techniques of philosophical-societies have become widespread, while these societies themselves (salons, clubs...) have lost their own vitality. Democracy has succeeded in the feat of "self-preservation" by making a collection of bodies, institutions and associations, function, more or less, as philosophical-societies. All these groups or groupings find themselves under the rule of that phenomenon "opinion", opinion manufactured by the machine.

"Above all, the man whose intelligence and character has not been formed by education ends up by losing his personality, deprived as he is of responsibility and freedom by this monstrous machine which has taken a firm hold everywhere and which enslaves social life in all its forms, spiritual, intellectual, political, civic and professional. It

<sup>74</sup> Quoted by Daniel Jacob in *Permanences* No.96 from the book by Copin Albancelli, *Comment je suis entré dans la franc-maçonnerie et comment j'en suis sorti.* (Perrin 1905)

<sup>75</sup> Satan in the City p. 109. Quoted in the AFS brochure *Connaissance élémentaire de la franc-maçonnerie.*

*confiscates even his family life by depriving him of his autonomy, and also his personal life by depriving him of silence and the opportunity to meditate.'*

#### **IV - Democracy in the church**

We can see the same things in the Church but perhaps more distinctly, as she has a smaller population and thus we can see the structure of her society more easily. The Church herself does not act as a *philosophical-society*, but a number of her organisations have adopted the technique. We find signs of this in the methods or techniques of groups. (cf. *Techniques de groupe et techniques subversives en milieu catholique* - éditions Téqui) We can cite the following as examples:

- transfer of personal authority (the important role played by Secretariats)
- bodies such as Assemblies of the Laity which are organised by an "interior circle" who pass out their collective opinion as that of the majority.
- forums or broad "free" discussions which are biased or even simply spontaneous.

Indeed, even if spontaneous, these discussions themselves are revolutionary from the moment they bring about an intellectual "dissolution"; teaching contempt for the basis of knowledge and personal effort. By their very nature, as we have seen, they can only "secrete" progressivism.

At the beginning of this exposé we cited a report on parish life which appeared in *Témoignage chrétien*. We can complete that illustration by a more general observation.<sup>76</sup>

In 1956, a Professor of History at the Catholic Faculty at Lyon, Abbé Louis Micolon, noted in *Chronique sociale*<sup>77</sup>:

*'Catholic action has multiplied the number of "Left-wing Catholics". It supplies only "Left-wing Catholics" (...) Even in bourgeois circles, Catholic action inevitably makes "Left-wing Catholics." It never makes people change from the left to the right, but always from the right to the left. It is a fact which we can verify statistically, and which is both far-reaching and replete with lessons.'*

Abbé Micolon found this normal and laudable. That is why he could write about it so serenely.

At the same time, Fr. Avril wrote: "There is no doubt that most Catholics class themselves politically on the right and that left-wing Catholics are a minority among French Catholics."<sup>78</sup>

For his part Adrien Dansette pointed out that left-wing Catholics, because of their possibilities of action, had considerable influence disproportionate to their numerical strength.<sup>79</sup>

But why? And how? A full reply is given by Joseph Folliet<sup>80</sup>:

<sup>76</sup> Presented by Jean Madiran in *Itinéraires*, No 79 January 1964

<sup>77</sup> 30th December 1956

<sup>78</sup> *Témoignage chrétien*, 18th November 1955.

<sup>79</sup> *Destin du catholicisme française* (1957)

<sup>80</sup> See Furet concerning this distinction between two types of society

*'In certain Catholic Action Groups, particularly at local level, I was able to verify the observations made by Augustin Cochin concerning "philosophical-societies" which preceded the French Revolution - notably the tendency of the groups to close in on themselves in an ideological orthodoxy (Needless to say I'm not talking here about Catholic orthodoxy, but of a group orthodoxy which is superimposed and supererogatory) inspired by a small central group in comparison with whom the other members found themselves outclassed.*

Not one of these three authors, we should note, can be classed as a traditionalist.

Madiran rightly emphasises that the opposition between natural institutions and Catholic institutions on the one hand and that type of "Catholic Action" on the other hand (and his remark is valid for a number of democratic institutions) which does not stem essentially from the intentions or specific desires of those who comprise or lead them. It stems primarily from the structures. We find ourselves faced with two radically dissimilar types of society engaged in a struggle the true nature of which is unbeknown to those taking part.

### **Conclusion of the Third Part**

Let us recall three facts established above:

1. There is no democracy without an apparatus. The apparatus belongs to democracy to which it owes everything: both ideas and the men.

2. For the apparatus to run it needs several conditions:

- an ideology, that of the rights of man (in the broad sense of that expression)
- a social void due to the failure of natural authorities
- men capable of manipulating and exploiting the various agencies, at all levels, with the true leaders acting in the shadows.

3. The "universal consensus" recognises free thought as the foundation of human dignity and in fact the soul of modern democracy.

In *Permanences* (No. 317 December 1994) Guy-Victor Pauchet wrote *'Only a return to reality, by refusing to reason in a vacuum will allow man to be remade and give him the strength which truth confers. It is truly a question of the restoration of the natural order. One step will be taken in this direction each time that one of the fundamental liberties necessary for the life of the social body is regained, each time that the parallel hierarchies and directing nuclei are eliminated, when the occult orientation is replaced by clear and frank directives from those who hold authority or by the advice of counsellors having the courage to affirm and justify their opinions openly. Such action which demands patience and tenacity will not be able to be led other than by those men who, in addition to having professional competence, have sufficient knowledge of subversive methods and structures to develop a reflex action against them, men having a complete vision of the social order both natural and Christian.*



## FOURTH PART

**ORGANIC DEMOCRACY****A Regime founded on organisation by social bodies.**

We have seen that modern democracy is unacceptable since it is founded on a false principle, and that classical democracy is beset with crippling disadvantages whenever it is applied to complex and large societies.

Are there other regimes which can be classified as democratic and are both acceptable doctrinally, and efficient enough to govern the large entities which constitute our modern societies?

**I - Reasonable democratic aspirations**

Aspirations which are said to be democratic manifest evil tendencies (rejection of social hierarchies, egalitarianism, democratic envy); but also comprise reasonable elements which may be legitimately satisfied.

Let us recall these:

- The aspirations of man to be able to voice his concerns on certain decisions which affect him directly<sup>81</sup>.
- The more general concern of being effectively represented in Government.
- The aspiration to have access to the leaders of social bodies in which he plays a part (community, workplace etc.) and to be able to participate in their decisions.

We call organic democracies<sup>82</sup> those regimes which enable these aspirations to be met at least in part, and which afford adequate representation by these bodies at State level.

**II - Doctrinal Aspects**

It is useful at this point to recall doctrinal aspects of the organisation of society and the constitution of states. This will allow us to have a better understanding of the characteristics and operation of organic democracies.

- **Organisation by Social Bodies**

When we talk about organisation by social bodies, what exactly do we mean by bodies or intermediate bodies.

*'Intermediate bodies are social groups, human groupings, situated between the isolated individual (or family, the basic cell of society) and the State.*

*They are constituted either naturally or by a deliberate agreement with the view of attaining a common end for the persons of whom they are comprised.*<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Cf. this remark by Pius XII in his radio message to the world of 24th December 1944: *'To express his own opinion about the obligations and sacrifices imposed upon him, and not to be forced to obey without first being given a hearing - these are two rights of the citizen which find their expression in democracy, as the name itself implies.'*

<sup>82</sup> Cf. Oliviera Salazar, *Principes d'action*, p.121; J Ploncard d'Assac, *Salazar*, p.100.

<sup>83</sup> Michel Creuzet, *Les Corps intermédiaires*, p.23

These are complementary; one to the other, and are found on a territorial basis (parishes, communities, provinces, regions), or professional basis (trades, firms, professions, professional associations), or on the basis of cultural or recreational interests. They constitute, with families, the elements which make up society (contrary to the revolutionary concept which considers society as a simple conglomeration of individuals, all equal).

René de la Tour du Pin<sup>84</sup> and Charles Maurras are among political authors who have developed the theme, of organisation by social bodies, as being the natural structure of society:

*'We must build up or organise France, or rather let it organise itself in a multitude of small groups which are natural, autonomous, true "republics", local, professional, moral and religious, sometimes intermingled one with the other, but governing themselves by free and spontaneous meetings.'*<sup>85</sup>

*The immediate aim of social politics must be to gather men together in the religious, economic or political order, not only according to their domicile, but also in accordance with their profession; in religion, according to their religious fraternity; in the economy by their corporations; in politics according to the representation of interests; in other words to develop the corporative regime with all its principles.'*<sup>86</sup>

"The Corporative Regime", said La Tour du Pin, using a term which many have sought to discredit in our times. He explained, moreover, that organisation of society by social bodies presupposes that above them is a political power which at the same time is independent of those it is required to control, while respectful of their rightful autonomy (the principle of subsidiarity).

It's basically a question of common sense, whereas revolutionary theories have taken the opposite point of view.

Let us consider some classical pontifical texts, beginning with the famous definition of the principle of subsidiarity by Pius XI in the encyclical "*Quadragesimo anno*" (15th May, 1931):

*'Still, that most weighty principle, which cannot be set aside or changed, remains fixed and unshaken in social philosophy: Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate organisations can do.'*

Elsewhere in the encyclical, Pius XI insists on the importance of vocational groups:

*'The aim of social legislation must therefore be the re-establishment of vocational groups'*

*'For as nature induces those who dwell in close proximity into municipalities, so those who practice the same trade or profession, economic or otherwise, combine into corporative groups. These groups, in a true sense autonomous, are considered by many to be, if not essential to civil society, at least its natural and spontaneous development.'*

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<sup>84</sup> René de la Tour du Pin (1834-1924), an army officer and founder and organiser with Albert de Mun of Catholic workers' circles, one of the teachers of the *Action française* school. His principal work *Vers un ordre social chrétien -1882-1907* has been recently republished.

<sup>85</sup> Charles Maurras, *Nos raisons*, p.10

<sup>86</sup> R. de la Tour du Pin, *Vers un ordre social chrétien*, p.196.

Recalling the doctrine expressed in this encyclical, Pius XII addressed Italian business leaders on 31st January 1952, advising them:

*'Nor can we ignore the changes in emphasis which distort the very wise words of our glorious predecessor, Pius XI, which gave weight and importance to the social programme of the Church, while our epoch view it as a secondary observation (...) and treat the principal part of the encyclical more or less in silence.'*

The organisation of society, and not only economic life, through intermediate bodies constitutes one of the fundamental points of the social doctrine of the Church.<sup>87</sup>

- **The Constitution of the State**

There too, especially since Montesquieu, revolutionary theories have confused ideas. We have borrowed some elements from a brief summary taken<sup>88</sup> from the book *Lettres aux Constituants* by Marcel de la Bigne de Villeneuve, professor of law, and known for his studies on the State. (The references for the following quotations are indicated by the page number at the end of each quotation.)

### **Unity of the State**

*'The first, the most fundamental and the most necessary character of the State is unity (...). According to St Thomas's observation unity, for a moral person or an institution, is not only a condition of life, but similar to life itself. (p.67)*

*'The power of the State is unique in its essence, unique in its essential attributes and in its effects, unique in its aim. It is unique because, by its very definition, there is only one authority that can be the highest, the strongest, supreme and sovereign.'*

Opposed to this sensible view is the theory of Montesquieu called the separation of powers, a theory which dismembers the state by dividing it into three extraneous powers, legislative, judicial and executive. Marcel de la Bigne de Villeneuve describes this as the illusory three-cornered hat (*chimère tricornue*)

### **Functions of the State**

The activity of the State cannot be divided into three parts as Montesquieu would have it, but rather into four. There are not three powers but rather four functions.

To classify these functions we must distinguish between what, by its very nature, belongs to free initiative, and what derives from the execution of antecedent positive rules. We have thus two categories of activity which are different by nature: one which asserts itself as being endowed with the power to originate legislation, and thus evidently the more important, and the other which appears to be derived, and up to a certain point, subordinate. (p.87)

In the first category figure **governmental** and **legislative** functions; in the second **administrative** and **jurisdictional** functions.

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<sup>87</sup> This organisation by the bodies in society has been indirectly recalled by Pius XII in his famous Christmas Message of 1944 on democracy, in the passage where he insisted on the distinction between people and "the masses".

<sup>88</sup> We will limit this summary to the points relevant to the subject being discussed here. We will touch upon neither the definition of the State *'The organic and organising unity of a true people.'* (Pius XII, Christmas 1944), nor its aim : the common good.

## The Services of the State

M. de la Bigne de Villeneuve distinguishes **necessary** services, **contingent** services and **parasitical** services.

**Necessary** services are those which, by definition, are indispensable to the State because they enable it to realise its aim, the common good. It covers many fields including security (the army, police, information), legislation, justice, representation, administration, finance and diplomacy.

### Representation Services

Among these many services we are interested here in the single service of representation: it is this which introduces the democratic element into a well-constructed State. By representation we mean: *'either an assembly of delegates of national groups or of citizens associated with the government of the state, or the mandate itself which is given to them.'*

It is important to distinguish between organs of representation and organs of direction; indeed its very much a matter here of elements having functions too diverse to be merged without grave disadvantages.

*'If the representation becomes (...) the government, we are driven to one of three equally deplorable eventualities: Either there is no more representation, or there is no more Government, or, and this is the more frequent case, representation and government find themselves at once corrupted, distorted and unrecognisable (p.153)*

It was the French Revolution which introduced confusion in this field when in 1789, the deputies of the Third Estate of the Estates General (an organ of representation) declared themselves unilaterally, the National Assembly, then the Constituent National Assembly and seized executive power.

### How do we arrange representation of the people

*'This people we have in mind is not a numerical collection of individuals arbitrarily demonstrating preferences and opinions based on passion, bias, ignorance and error, but "a hierarchy of families, professions, communities, territorial, intellectual, and spiritual associations, linked together and federated to form a homeland." It is from these living realities that the future representative organs must naturally proceed.*

*Such associations are indeed capable of furnishing representation on a solid basis, because they are founded upon stable, permanent and legitimate interests. Their members will explain what they wish in a clear and intelligent manner worthy of obtaining a hearing by the State and having these wishes satisfied in so far as this is compatible with the common good. In the same way, the delegated powers which they accord to their spokesmen will not be a blank cheque without any serious sanction. They revert to a true mandate which is limited and precise, like that given to the deputies to the Provincial Estates and Estates General of the old France. Thus representation would regain that fidelity, loyalty and precision which are among its first and most essential attributes' (p.157)<sup>89</sup>.*

Through this we would rediscover the organisation of society by intermediate bodies. It is normally through the intermediary of social bodies, of which they form part, that citizens can be adequately represented at State level.

How will the delegates from each social body be appointed?

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<sup>89</sup> The passages between double inverted commas in this quotation are taken from a speech by Marshal Pétain on 8th July 1941.

*'A well organised election has irreplaceable advantages. But the rights of lineage and the merits acquired by intelligence and work which are required to carry out the functions of a delegate must also be taken into account' (p.158)*

Representation arranged in such a manner is likely to satisfy the legitimate democratic aspirations mentioned above.

### **III -Two types of representation - the corporative type and the democratic type**

Depending on whether or not we respect the principles governing the constitution of the State, which we recalled earlier, we will be drawn towards one of two different systems of representation. In his book, *Penser la Révolution française*, François Furet describes one as corporative, the other as democratic:

*'Central to Augustin Cochin's thought is the opposition between the two types of representation and political action: the type which I will call, for want of a better term, corporative, or based on the Ancien Régime, by which authority consults a nation constituted of "bodies". And the democratic type which Cochin also called "English" by which authority takes advice from elected people constituted from a social body entirely atomised into equal individuals.'*

#### **The "corporative" type of representation**

*'In the first type, society maintains its real state, its hierarchies, its decisions and acquired rights, its leaders, the diversity of its values, its history. It has therefore no need to create personnel specialised in politics since these politics are only an extension of its activity. Furthermore it has its natural leaders, who receive peremptory mandates.'*

#### **The "democratic" type**

*'In the second type, society, in order to participate in politics, must don new clothes, becoming an abstract society of equal individuals, a people comprised of electors. The executive power addresses each individual but not in the context of his natural environment, his activities or his values, but rather apart from these, as it is only the vote which makes this abstract individual into a real individual. Thus the need to invent politics which is the domain of this new reality; and the specialists in this field of mediation, the politicians. Because a people is reduced by this democratic definition to the sum of equal individuals, it is no longer capable of autonomous activity, it is dispossessed of its real relationship to the social world on the one hand, and at thus deprived of the ability to voice its particular interest and demonstrate its competence concerning the questions being debated; on the other hand the act which brings about a democratic type of society, the vote, is established and determined without reference the people. All that is asked of them is to assent to what is proposed. "Career politicians merely present the citizen with ready-made policies and men."*

#### **Substitutes introduced by classical democracy**

*'Politics is thus seen to be complementary to democracy; it is a specialism dealing in a consensus mythically relieved of its social burden. It therefore requires substitutes for the "natural" practices of organised bodies; these it finds in politicians, political parties and political ideologies.<sup>90</sup>*

Here again revolutionary theories have sown confusion. Today we hardly ever think of representation of the people other than in accordance with the democratic type, taking no account whatever of social bodies, whereas the normal process of representation is through the corporative type.

<sup>90</sup> François Furet, *Penser la Révolution française* (éd. Gallimard, 1978), chapter "Augustin Cochin : la théorie du jacobinisme" (p. 225-226)

#### **IV - Every properly-constituted State can be considered as an organic democracy.**

The preceding factors demonstrate that a State, constituted in accordance with sound doctrine, protects the organisation of society by intermediate bodies, supporting them and giving them suitable representation. In doing so it satisfies the legitimate aspirations of those who require to be represented. We have indicated that such a State can be described as an organic democracy, as it is built on a sound foundation and not upon revolutionary aberrations. It follows therefore that one might expect to find more organic democracies under the *Ancien Regime* (which respected the organisation of society through intermediate bodies) than today (where States are all more or less imbued with theories which are described as liberal but, in other words revolutionary).

Let us concentrate on two aspects of organic democracy:

**The role of the vote:** Here the vote finds its normal role in nominating the whole or part of a delegation from intermediate bodies thus ensuring representation. In sound political doctrine the vote is not eliminated but merely used where it produces good results.

#### **The distinction between the executive and representative organs**

We have already noted the importance of this distinction. But if elected delegates in an organic democracy were to give or arrogate to themselves executive roles, such democracy would revert to classical democracy - with all the disadvantages that entails. That is what happened in France in 1789.

#### **V - Salazar and organic democracy**

It is in Portugal, during the 40 years (1928-1968) when this country was ruled by Oliveira Salazar, that we find the best modern example of an organic democracy being partially realised. What was the theoretical basis of Portuguese organic democracy? What were the practical aspects of its operation? We find the answers to these questions in the following books: *Principes d'action* (éditions Fayard, 1956) by Oliveira Salazar, and *Salazar* (éditions DMM 1983) and *Doctrines du nationalisme* (éditions de Chiré 1978) by Jacques Ploncard d'Assac. We will limit ourselves to a brief summary of the theory as Salazar described it and which he - at least partially - put into practice.

#### **Principles not up for discussion**

*'We will try our best to give to those souls torn apart by doubt and by the destructive spirit of the century the comfort of the great certitudes. God,<sup>91</sup> nor virtue will not be up for discussion. Nor shall our homeland or its history, nor authority or its prestige, nor the family or its morality, nor glory or the duty to work.'<sup>92</sup>*

#### **The organisation of society through intermediate bodies**

*'Our constitution tends towards the establishment of an organic democracy, which the corporative organisation will accomplish, once it has been extended to all forms of social activity.'<sup>93</sup>*

<sup>91</sup> [It seems that the author, Dr Salazar, is referring here to the National Movement and is not suggesting that the Movement is indifferent to God or virtue but rather that it does not call them into question, it takes them for granted. - Translator]

<sup>92</sup> O. Salazar, *Principes d'action*, p.63.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid, p.121.

'The State must reflect (...) the Nation itself as an organic whole and the intervention of individuals in the development of organs of sovereignty will depend more and more on what they themselves are in national life as the heads of families, producers, the supporters of such and such a policy, and promoters of education, charitable work, leisure or sport. It is the politics of real life.'<sup>94</sup>

The political liberalism of the 19th Century has given us the "citizen", an individual uprooted from family, social class, profession, cultural environment, economic strata, and has given him the facultative right to intervene in the constitution of the State. This citizen has been made the source of national sovereignty.

But, all things considered, we find ourselves in the presence of an abstraction, an erroneous and inadequate concept, and we must move in the direction of natural groups which are so necessary for our individual lives, and which really constitute political society, if we are to find a more sure base for the kind of organisation of society we seek.<sup>95</sup>

It is in the direction of "the natural groups which are so necessary for individual life and which really constitute political society" that Salazar means to find the base from which to develop the constitution of the State.

At the very base is the family, the irreducible social cell, the original nucleus of the parish, of the community, and thus of the nation. It is therefore by its very nature the first of the organic political elements of a constitutional State.

Following the family, are the moral and economic corporate bodies. In Salazar's opinion they must possess "influential political rights in the organisation of the State."

And finally, he says "We want to build a social and corporative State in close relationship to the natural constitution of society."<sup>96</sup>

What type of organisation must we then prefer? We have applied ourselves to the task of finding a formula which would meet the following conditions.

a. The organisation must relieve the modern State, which is monstrous and hypertrophied, and give to others some of its services, its functions and its expense. By this single deed it will defend both individual liberty and private savings.

b. The organisation must be modelled on the real life of man, in the family, in the professions and in society, even if this impairs its theoretical purity or symmetry. And subject to these conditions it must use to the best effect possible, all known and informal forms of organisations, so as to integrate them into the overall plan.

c. The organisation must not separate economic and the social, for the fundamental reason that all those who work are in one way or another interdependent in the task of production and it is by production that all must live.

d. The organisation must not lose sight of the realities of life especially those which exist over and above the interests of individuals. It will only succeed in being truly useful if it satisfies the legitimate interests of private individuals, while working at the same time in the interest of the common good.

It is for these reasons that from amongst the different possible types of organisation and corporatism, we have sought to establish the Portuguese corporative organisation.<sup>97</sup>

<sup>94</sup> Text by Salazar, quoted by J. Ploncard d'Assac, *Doctrines du nationalisme*, p.349

<sup>95</sup> O. Salazar, *Principes d'action*, p.108.

<sup>96</sup> J. Ploncard d'Assac, quoting a speech made by Salazar on 30th July 1930.

<sup>97</sup> O. Salazar, *Principes d'action*, p.119-120.

## The system of representation

'This consists in 'bringing into existence an authentic representation of the nation as it is organised in its natural structures.'<sup>98</sup>

'Families, parishes, municipalities and corporations where all citizens live, with their fundamental juridical freedoms, are the organisms which go to make up the nation and they must be able as such to intervene directly in the constitution of the supreme bodies of the State: this is a statement which expresses the meaning of the representative system more faithfully than any other.'<sup>99</sup>

'I am therefore convinced that the solution to the problem expressed above (How does one plan a State adapted to the complexities of civilised society?) will require the type of State in which all the interests in the fully organised nation, will have effective and direct representation, through the intermediary of its own representatives.'<sup>100</sup>

## End of the fourth part

If we really must use the word democracy on the ground that its advantages (from the psychological point of view) outweigh its disadvantages (arising from the many senses in which it might be understood) then we ought to talk about organic democracy: it alone is acceptable in politics today.

This may be a good starting point on which to base a whole body of ideas and training, both doctrinal and historical, concerning the State, its functions and its services, the common good, the organisation of society through intermediate bodies, subsidiarity - all essential knowledge for those with any interest in politics.

## GENERAL CONCLUSION

As we shown in the first and second parts of this study, classical and modern democracy place us in the midst of a political illusion. It is an illusion because the outward appearance of this phenomenon (government by the people) is contrary to reality (government of the people by pressure groups and oligarchies).

Modern democracy adds a false doctrine to this illusion - popular sovereignty - which makes the man-citizen a god who refuses to accept any law which he himself has not drafted and approved. This gives rise to a spirit of disobedience and revolt against the natural order. In contrast, organic democracy respects the order of things. It takes account of social bodies and hierarchies. It presupposes a spirit of obedience throughout the social scale and an adequate system of constraint where that fails. It seeks to satisfy the just aspirations of citizens to be effectively represented at government level.

Two opposed systems therefore present themselves under the same term, democracy. One in which individualism more or less predominates, and the other which is founded on the opposite of individualism in politics: the organisation of society through social bodies. This opposition was highlighted by Elisabeth Badinter in her book "L'un et l'autre" (p.194):

*Democracy<sup>101</sup> is incompatible with the paternal power of former times. All emancipation is primarily freedom from the influence of the father. Popular sovereignty is born of parricide. In killing the father-king, the people, who had for*

<sup>98</sup> J. Ploncard d'Assac, *Salazar*, p.71.

<sup>99</sup> O. Salazar, *Principes d'action*, p.109. Parishes are the smallest administrative units in Portugal.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid*, p.118.

<sup>101</sup> i.e. modern democracy



centuries been kept in the state of a minor, gained autonomy as adults. To reach this stage they had to guillotine the sovereign publicly, so that all might be aware of this change in status. With the act accomplished a reversal of values took place. The triptych: Liberty, Equality, Fraternity was substituted for the former: Submission, Hierarchy and Paternity. In the republic, fraternal friendship between citizens replaced the sentiment of respect which united sons to father. The vertical ties gave place to horizontal ties which alone were compatible with the egalitarian ideal.'

To allow us to choose between these two systems we must know what distinguishes or characterises them.

In the abundant Catholic literature on democracy these important distinctions are practically never made. Let's take one example. In an account given in *L'Homme Nouveau* of 1st December 1996, about the recent meeting of Catholic Jurists on the theme "The Church and Democracy", we were advised that: *'the speakers were unanimous: the Church does not condemn the democratic principle. On the contrary "the social doctrine of the Church", according to Mgr Minnerah, "contains within it the seeds of democracy"'*. What does he mean by "the democratic principle"? What type of democracy is it whose seeds are contained in the social doctrine of the Church? The readers of that article cannot know unless they read the records of this meeting.

Hence the importance of clarifying ideas on the subject of democracy which bear upon the more general subject of the method of appointing political leaders. This is a fundamental subject because, as Scripture says:

*'In exaltatione justorum multa gloria est; regnantibus impiis, ruinae hominum.'*

*'In the joy of the just there is great glory: when the wicked reign, men are ruined.'*

## ANNEXE I

### Christian Democracy

In 1945 the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* (MRP) had a remarkable electoral success. Catholic and liberal this party was not new. It was able to invoke the patronage of Lacordaire, Montalembert and Mgr Dupanloup. It was republican having aligned itself politically to the "*ralliement*" of Leo XIII. It was Christian-Democrat having derived from de Lamennais, Ozanam, Marc Sangnier and his Sillon. The names of the Abbés Lemire, Gayraud, Trochu, Dabry, Naudet are part of its history.

#### • ITS ORIGINS

*'The origin of the MRP goes back to the Revolution'* writes Robert Bichet in his history of Christian Democracy and the MRP. The term "Christian Democracy" appears, it seems, for the first time, in a speech given on 21st November 1791 to the Legislative Assembly, by the celebrated, constitutional bishop of Lyons, Lamourette. He used the expression in the sense of popular Christianity. But from 1792 he voiced concern about the rapprochement between the Right and Left (the "*fameux baisers*" episode), and this speech is held by Christian Democrats as their first fundamental declaration. Because of this aim Lamourette and Abbé Grégoire were the precursors of the movement to bring together the Church of the people and democracy.

Throughout the history of Christian Democracy, we come across the fruits of 1789 and a certain blind optimism in human nature, an act of faith in the competence, foresight and infallibility of the elector and thus a corresponding questioning of authority and its source and form. The people may err, but, being an absolute monarch and bringing its influence to bear upon itself, it is never culpable. It becomes a competing divinity opposing itself to God.

During all of the Napoleonic epoch and the Restoration, the question of democracy and therefore Christian Democracy did not arise. However, we should note that the constitutional charter which Louis XVIII promulgated in 1814 was impregnated with liberalism. Pius VII underlined this on April 29th 1814 when he stated: *'By the very fact of establishing liberty of all cults without distinction, one confuses truth and error.'* Far from being grateful to the king for this liberty which he proposed, French society would use it against him in distancing itself from those remedies which could have re-established the royal fortunes. The excitement of the Restoration spread in this climate of *'liberty which favoured the action of Masonic lodges. The liberal conspiracy was no more than an impostor hiding under the shadow of the lodge.'*

Christian democracy and Catholic liberalism have a shared history. It's not just to simplify matters that we amalgamate, under the term Christian democrats, subscribers to various shades of opinion who, during successive periods were called, liberals, modernists or progressives. *'Are these not only their forenames? Their common patronym derives altogether from their devotion to democracy, mixed with an identical religious outlook, with common propositions.'*<sup>102</sup>

- **Catholic Liberalism and Christian Democracy from Lamennais to the Syllabus**

### **Lamennais**

We must attribute the birth of Catholic liberalism to Abbé Félicité de Lamennais (1782-1854) whose influence is great even today. We are even witnessing a move to rehabilitate Lamennais (led moreover by those who made their names recently in the new catechetics). François Mauriac claimed that Lamennais was the founder of the MRP. The Abbé Lemire writes: *'This great reformer was odiously destroyed for having sought too soon the movement which one day must save Catholicism for us.'*

Personal inspiration and imagination dominated Lamennais' thought. Salvation, for him, lay in an immense development of individual liberty. In 1830 he challenged both the political powers-that-be and religious authority. Lamennais and his team envisioned a Catholic renewal and the reconquest of minds through the agency of liberty. For that reason he recommended not only freedom of education but also separation of Church and State. The Church was no longer to claim freedom other than as its share in the patrimony of public liberties. This was a great stride towards the destruction of the principle of authority. His newspaper *L'Avenir* was condemned in 1830. Lamennais broke with Rome in 1834. Lacordaire and Montalembert, at first contributors to *L'Avenir*, pulled out, but Lacordaire carried on preaching the necessity to adapt to the times. He thought that the defence of God and the Church ordained that one must go with the tide. He presented as his ideal, American democracy, *'prophecy and forerunner of the future state of Christian nations.'*

### **L'ère nouvelle**

In 1848 we find certain disciples of Lamennais around Ozanam and the Abbé Maret. Christian democracy then took on a truly political meaning and was defined as a democratic government which claimed to be inspired by Christianity. This was the thesis defended in "*L'Ère nouvelle*" whose circulation was exceptional (more than 20,000 copies). *'Democracy, there lies the future'*, wrote Maret to a minister of the Cavaignac government (1848). Bichet presented the revolution of 1848 as being democratic and Christian in inspiration, since clergy and people together were seen to plant the trees of liberty. The succession of Prince Napoleon marked the end of democratic activity and Catholic democracy disappeared until the 1890's. However, Catholic liberalism remained as active as before.

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<sup>102</sup> Robert Joseph, *Itinéraires* No. 236. That issue was devoted to religious democracy. It had been written to mark the republishing of Maurras's work, *La démocratie religieuse*.

## The Falloux law and its consequences

It was the Falloux law of 1850 which marked the beginning of the deep division between Catholics: between the faction of Montalembert, Ozanam, Lacordaire (who had supported Falloux) and that of Dom Guéranger, Msgr Pie and Louis Veuillot. The law, by virtue of what it gave the Church and denied her, began the great conflict between liberalism and those opposed to it. The law's detractors reproached it for establishing a State monopoly over precedence, the choice of books, methods, and the conferment of degrees. It is true that this law did not prevent Jules Ferry's action against religious congregations. But it is also true that the Falloux law was an improvement on previous legislation. Msgr Pie would explain gently that while not being able to obtain all to which we had a right, it was natural that we should not wish to renounce what we were offered. This moderate support for the law did not satisfy its promoters who wanted an unequivocal approval. Polemics broke out. The differences would become increasingly bitter between those who had as their first priority the liberty of the Church and the maintenance of her rights, and those who sought to determine what degree of Christianity modern society would accept and then invited the Church to operate within these limits.

## Catholic liberalism - Montalembert

Like other forms of liberalism which all desire to emancipate the civil order from the religious order, Catholic liberalism seeks the independence of Church and State, admittedly not as a truth in principle, but in practice, as the best condition of existence and life, particularly to protect the Church from illegitimate support which it risks receiving or giving. We will not place great emphasis here on the fundamental questions raised by such an attitude which is full of contradictions. But if a set order established by God does exist, how can it be useful to ignore it? History itself shows that there are more advantages than disadvantages in the union of the two powers.

Liberalism wishes to take the Revolution into account; but *'the bad does not always seek to drive out the good; it asks merely to cohabit with it. A secret instinct tells it that, when it seeks something, it seeks everything. Let it once cease to be hated, and it will feel itself loved.'* (Ernest Hello) Liberalism dreads the flame that blazes and, not less, the flame which enlightens. It pretends to take up a position in the happy medium; adapting to the times, believing and wishing even to renounce nothing it recognises as fundamental; and yet how do we equate this with Abbé Naudet, who rejected the *Imitation of Christ* because it was written by a monk in the 14th century and thus not suited to a non-monastic era?

Montalembert's speech at Malines (1863) is very precise: when I speak of freedom, I mean freedom in its entirety, freedom founded on the common law and equality. He quotes Mgr Dupanloup: *'We accept, we invoke the principles and the liberties proclaimed in 1789'*. It is Montalembert again who makes the future of modern society depend on the solution of two problems: to correct democracy by liberty and to reconcile Catholicism with democracy. We can therefore see that one of the fundamentals of Catholic liberalism is to baptise democracy and canonise the word "liberty" which lends itself to very different interpretations. It therefore builds its edifice on the equivocal. Indeed the history of the first years of the 20th century would very soon show the utopian nature of the slogan "a free church in a free state".

## The Syllabus of Errors (8th December 1864)

Pope Pius IX reacted to the declaration of Malines with the encyclical *Quanta Cura* and the *Syllabus*. Briefly these texts show: that it is absurd to say that the best government is the one which is least disposed to put its power at the service of the Church; that it is absurd to believe that the perfection of society and its greater

political good can be gained through a society indifferent to religion. Pius IX stressed that if liberal Catholics profess to love the Church and consecrate their talents to her, they are none the less active in perverting her spirit and her doctrine. Besides such is the role played by Modernism.

It was in this context that the First Vatican Council took place (1870). It is evident that liberal Catholics judged the definition of papal infallibility as inopportune. The arguments were set in train. Among the liberals, one finds Msgr Dupanloup, who would obey and Msgr Darboy who would not; among their adversaries one finds the layman, Louis Veuillot, the editor of *L'Univers*.

- **Christian Democracy from 1890 to the First World War**

### **The Ralliement (1892)**

It is important to develop the subject of the *Ralliement* which is full of misunderstandings and even contradictions.

We know the facts. In 1890, at the request of Leo XIII, Mgr Ferrata furnished a report on the situation in France. The future nuncio drew a picture of the difficulties suffered by French Catholics and of their powerlessness to rise above them because *'of the failure to achieve full agreement in the episcopate, the political divisions among Catholics, the absence of a stable, permanent and serious organisation, and their systematic opposition to the existing government.* 'Shortly thereafter, Cardinal Lavignerie at Algiers, in the course of a toast in honour of the squadron, declared: *The moment has come when, to put an end to our divisions we must sacrifice all that conscience and honour permits and requires each person to sacrifice for the salvation of the country.'* In other words the issue of the regime is a stumbling block, remove the obstacle, accept the constitutional framework and we will be united.

On 16th February 1892 in the encyclical "*Au milieu des sollicitudes*", then in his letter to the Cardinals of 13th August 1893, the Pope asked Catholics to unite themselves in defence of the faith and to suspend those political activities which did not have as their direct, immediate and only object this urgent task. One can see in this instruction a concern to appease internal opposition so as to struggle more effectively as a single body against the anti-religious laws. But there is also a compromise, and as in all compromises, some contradictions. Ambiguity existed between the official text which focused on the union required for struggle against the anti-religious laws and the attitude of Leo XIII who advocated a rallying behind the republic, even while pointing out that it hid within itself sects working for the de-Christianisation of France. Ambiguity also existed between the acceptance of a form of government (Classical democracy) and acceptance of an ideology (modern democracy), when it was almost impossible even for the French of our epoch to distinguish them. There was even ambiguity concerning the nature of the document: was it advice, a directive or a strict order? We ought therefore to recall the conclusion arrived at by Arnaud de Lassus in the AFS supplement, *Politique et Religion* :

*'What a sad distressing affair.*

*A Pope giving the French an instruction to resist perverse laws, an instruction which was practically incompatible with the politics of compromise which he pursued himself, and an instruction to rally behind the regime which was issued simultaneously.*

*A clergy which presented and carried out the instruction to rally behind the regime as if it were an order, when it was no more than advice.*

*Catholics who often understood nothing and contented themselves with following the easiest path; that of rallying themselves to the regime; which justified their passivity in defence of the Catholic positions.*

*Committed politicians - at least they appeared so - who disowned their past allegiance and lost credibility with the electorate.*

*All this translated itself into political defeat which only served to accelerate the course of separation of Church and State and from which French Catholics have never recovered.*

*It seems that a deeper doctrinal appraisal of this matter would have allowed us, at least in part, to avoid this torrent of misfortunes.*

*Let the memory of this great disaster in the history of France serve to encourage the reader to study the saving doctrine of the Church: "It is the teaching of the Church which contains the words and the sacraments of eternal salvation and even temporal salvation."*

### **The Democratic Priests - The first Christian Democratic Party**

Catholic Liberalism, then the *Ralliement* which followed were adaptations to the times.

Christian Democracy properly so called went much further. It did not consider that an adaptation for the sake of gaining success was enough. It exalted the new right, it gave democracy attributes having an eternal value. Democracy became the offspring of Christianity even if it was not always presented as the realisation of the evangelical maxims in institutions of society. How did this happen? How did personalities - so admirable in many ways - like Ozanam come to such a pass?

Havard de la Montagne attributes the reason for the growth of Christian Democracy to the fact that the *Ralliement* and the encyclical *Rerum Novarum* occurred within two months of each other. Some had seen, he said, one being the complement of the other. Albert de Mun, himself, became a Republican neophyte after the *Ralliement* and saw in these texts a great development of the same thought, i.e. the Pope's attempt to break the social, economic and political shackles created by man's vested interests.

Christian Democrats were not slow to conclude in favour of the marriage of democracy with the Church. For sure, Albert de Mun and his circles of Catholic workers opposed the Declaration of the Rights of Man; and took his stand from the *Syllabus*. Besides he would devote himself more and more to social action and alert Christian democrats against political activity which sought to abandon the original ideal of reconciling workers and owners. In fact Albert de Mun was not a Christian Democrat, even though that party have claimed him, so that some of his prestige might rub off on them

The year 1892 marked the beginning of a new wave of enthusiasm in priests who saw in the two texts of Leo XIII the wind of Pentecost. They even spoke of consecrating democracy in the manner of Joan of Arc's action in securing the consecration of the king at Reims .

*'The democratic priests carried out their action in an uncoordinated manner, each in his own fashion, around a nucleus of friends and disciples. One of the more famous was the Abbé Lemire, deputy for Hazebrouck.. and promoter of workers' allotments. Most of them wrote and distributed innumerable brochures and books and created many newspapers. Some dailies at first, like **Le Monde** by Abbé Naudet which appeared from 1894 to 1896 when it wound up through lack of readers; **Le Peuple français** of Abbé Garnier; **La France libre** at Lyon.*

*There were also the weeklies and reviews: **La Justice sociale** of Abbé Naudet, **La vie catholique** of Abbé Dabry, **La démocratie chrétienne** of Abbé Six, which appeared at Lille from 1894 to 1907. Besides these democratic*

priests were members of the laity enthusiastic for these new ideas. Among them was a young marine purser at Brest, Emmanuel Desgrées-du-Lou, who renounced his career to found in 1899, with Abbé Trochu, a newspaper which was Christian Democratic in inspiration, **L'Ouest-Éclair**, today known as **Ouest-France**, which had a strong influence in the west of France. One of its editors was the advocate Henri Teitgen who, until his death, would remain one of the leaders of Christian democracy.

Another layman, a philosopher, Georges Fonsegrive, founded **La Quinzaine**, which appeared from 1894 to 1906. He published a novel **Le Fils de l'esprit** which, wrote Raymond Laurent, was a guide for the founders of the Popular Democratic Party in their youth.

In all regions of France local groups called democratic union or democratic action were established around these newspapers and reviews.

At the same time in 1893, 1894, and 1896, Congresses of Christian Workers were held. A Catholic-social industrialist from Reims, Léon Harmel, the “godfather” of the factory at Val des Bois, as he was called, tried hard to federate these different groups. The Workers’ Congress at Reims on 25th May 1896 decided to found the Christian Democratic Party, the first party of that name created in the world. This new party was impregnated with Modernism and Rome preferred the **L'action libérale populaire** of Jacques Piou and Albert de Mun. Then in 1901 the encyclical **Graves de communi** was published which forbade the use of expression Christian democracy for political purposes. In 1902 the first Christian Democratic Party disappeared.’

## Americanism

We know what influence the American model had over the democrats (de Tocqueville). Fr. Hecker considered as the initiator of what would come to be described as Americanism declared himself it to be modern, individual and democratic. Individualist, in the sense of being in favour of individual initiative and personal effort; for him the motor is the interior impulse of the Holy Spirit: liberty and personal independence were his points of reference. A Democrat, because the form of government in the United States of America appeared to him to be the most favourable for the development of the active virtues, giving them a greater freedom of action. It makes man more capable of co-operating with the internal guidance of the Holy Spirit in the individual soul. He is eager to give priority to these active virtues which alone are worthy of emancipated modern man, conscious of himself, over those passive virtues of penitence, humility, obedience and abnegation. Leo XIII would denounce, in *Testem benevolentiae* (1898), this adaptation of the Church to the age which is the foundation of Americanism. He rejected this distinction between active and passive virtues which implies that these natural virtues were better suited to our age than were supernatural virtues.

## The Sillon

Americanism was the front runner for the *Sillon*, the main vehicle of Christian democracy. Born at the end of the 19th century (the first edition of the *Sillon* appeared in 1894) it had among its founders Marc Sangnier (1873-1950). A student of the *École Polytechnique*, an eloquent orator, generous, a real crowd-puller, he galvanised the masses. Maurras admitted that he was attracted by his personality: “*This young man is a power to be reckoned with*”. Officially Sangnier’s initial aims were:

- To form in Catholic milieux groups which would become more and more aware of the moral and social forces which they had at their disposal, and prepared to free Catholicism of all prejudice and bias which disfigure it.
- To rely on these groups, at the heart of which were study circles, in order to radiate Christian influence in indifferent or hostile milieux.

It is impossible in just a few lines to describe all that the *Sillon*<sup>103</sup> represented ( and still represents). In its early days it received great praise and encouragement from Bishops, from Leo XIII and Pius X. La Tour du Pin gave it his support. However, as time went on the *Sillon* which had originally sought to Christianise democracy inverted the formula and sought to democratise Catholicism.

In 1906, in *La Croix*, Marc Sangnier wrote: “*Le Sillon has as its aim to establish a democratic republic in France.*” He said it was not therefore a Catholic movement in the sense that it was to be at the disposal of the bishops. The *Sillon* was a lay movement, but profoundly religious. Indeed the Sillonists openly recognised that they needed Catholicism not only to gain their personal salvation as individuals but also to have the moral strength and virtues demanded by the temporal works they proposed to undertake.

It looked to democracy, but affirmed, as far as possible, that it is essential to arrive at some sort of identification of the common interest with the particular moral interest of each citizen. Sangnier is alleged to have remarked that he would bring about democracy by ‘*making each elector a saint by giving him a king’s soul.*’

This idealism won over Catholics of the Left. The *Sillon’s* journal quickly translated this into a hallucinating mystique. They would speak about the democracy of the divine life by invoking the Holy Spirit, with the mysterious equality of three persons, and about a democratic fraternity in relation to the Eucharist.

Sangnier bound up Catholicism with democracy: democratic ideas do not come naturally to men; one man raised Himself against political barbarism and made the democratic principle prevail, that man is Christ. Sangnier advised that one should not be unaware of the truly Christian element in the revolutionary temperament and even in the Declaration of the Rights of Man.

Social immanence sums up the doctrine of the *Sillon*. In reality it is only a transcription of the religious immanence which constitutes the basis of the modernist thesis. Social error had at its foundation a dogmatic error. Rome had to intervene on 28th August 1910 (*Notre charge apostolique*). It is a must to read it again. It is a fundamental text which today is particularly topical.<sup>104</sup>

Among the errors, Pius X denounced allegiance of religion to a political party:

*‘In the first place, its Catholicism only fits in with the democratic form of government which it regards as most favourable to the Church and as, so to speak, one with her. It thus subjects its religion to a political party. We have not to prove that the advent of universal democracy has nothing to do with the action of the Church in the world; we have already explained that the Church has always left nations free to choose the form of government which they regard as best for their interests. Once again, following our predecessor, We want to affirm that there is error and danger in binding the Catholic Church by principle to one form of government - error and danger are all the greater when religion is identified with a form of democracy the doctrines of which are erroneous. And this is the case with the Sillon, which does in fact, and for a special political form, compromise the Church, and so divides Catholics, draws young people and even priests and seminarians away from purely Catholic action and uses most wastefully the living forces of a part of the nation.’*

Despite the letter of submission by Marc Sangnier, the friends of the *Sillon* have never hidden the fact that his ideas continue to be spread ‘*The Sillon has disappeared, the Sillonists remain*’ (Étienne Borne). Robert Bichet in his history of Christian democracy and the MRP wrote: ‘*Twenty years, thirty years after, in my electoral campaigns at*

<sup>103</sup> Maurras made a study of this, *Le Dilemme de Marc Sangnier*, which is included in his work *La démocratie religieuse*.

<sup>104</sup> The Bishop of Chartres redistributed this text in 1952 and included a preface which was a very clear synthesis of the letter.

*Doubs and in Seine-et-Oise, I rediscovered Sillonists whose enthusiasm was undiminished and who became my best supporters.'*

*'It is a seed which has produced an abundant harvest.'* (Dansette).

*'The Holy Father scattered the good seed and threw it all over the fields of France, it germinated everywhere, hardy and fruitful.'* (Robert Pigelet)

We must add that the intellectual fragility of the *Sillon* became more pronounced through two influences which gave it a new lease of life: Jacques Maritain <sup>105</sup>and Emmanuel Mounier.

### **Christian Democracy and Modernism**

In modernist errors there can be found at the same time, agnosticism, immanentism and pragmatism. Modernists wish to reform the Church, remould Catholicism and transform it into a non-dogmatic Christianity. We know that this is a consequence of Kant's subjectivism. For the Modernist theology becomes an experimental science, religion becomes a mysterious feeling which germinates under the force of some necessity. All is intelligible: the mysterious and the supernatural no longer exist. However, in exorcising dogmas one keeps the formulae.

Christian democrats say that they do not recognise themselves in this description; their people do not know Kant. However it is in Christian Democracy's magazines and journals that Loisy is supported and exalted. Abbé Naudet's newspaper, *La Justice*, 'publishes a number of texts which call into question the historicity of the gospels and miracles. *La Quinzaine*, the great journal of Christian Democracy, protests against the fanatics of orthodoxy, and its religious outlook is modernist: "more and more, religion is taking possession of its own domain which is neither the forum, nor the school, nor the natural sciences but the spiritual communion of man with God".'

Elsewhere, Christian democrats preach a humanitarian religion. They question the value of dogmas, they undertake the reform of philosophy using modern philosophy as a basis, they are attracted to evolutionism in science, speak in the name of the sense of history and wish to reform the ecclesiastical institution in all its branches, particularly in the field of discipline.

It is very much these aspects of a reforming mania that Pius X envisaged in Pascendi in 1907. Fonsegrives was able to say: 'The act just performed by Pius X is the rupture of diplomatic relations between the Church and the age.' He condemned, Fonsegrives said, the very principle of all negotiations.'

It is worth noting that the Christian Democrat, Fonsegrives, added, 'Modernists will bow down with respect before the hand which disciplines them; they will suffer nobly and in silence.' This forecast has been shown to be largely false. Modernism has impregnated and continues to impregnate the 20th century. Modernists have pursued their activity in the open where it was possible to do so and under cover whenever they met difficulties.

Some naive folk have asserted that the Christian Democrats made a profound impression on the Chamber of Deputies at that time. Have they not confused personal and temporal benefits with the permanent and superior benefits of religion? 'The Church has not regained a soul from us but we have won many from her - there is the truth of the matter', said the radical-socialist Henry Bérenger. We remember also the judgement of Jaurès

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<sup>105</sup> Maritain presented democracy as the secular outcome of the spirit of the Gospel at work in history; it guaranteed for him the inviolable mystery of spiritual freedom. (*Christianisme et démocratie*, 1932).



on the ineffectiveness of those who in their desire to negotiate, failed to display doctrinal firmness. We can equally recall the sharp rejoinder of the Communist Florimond Bonte, at Lille (10th April 1927):

*'As for you Christian Democrats, we will not fight you. You are too useful to us. If you want to know what work you are doing, look at me. I'm from your stable. Before the war I was one of you. Since then I have followed the principles you have taught me to their logical conclusion. Thanks to you, Communism has penetrated where you would not let its men enter; your schools, youth clubs, study circles and unions. Spare no trouble.. Everything you Christian Democrats do for yourselves, you do for the Communist revolution.'*<sup>106</sup>

Concession is another word for renunciation and all renunciation implies some conspicuous surrender. In recent years, we have *La Croix* removing the crucifix which adorned its banner headline. We have *La vie Catholique* crossing out the epithet it displayed -undeserved as it was; and the CFTC (Confederation of Christian Trade Unions) which inherited the Sillon's property (the chateau of Bieuville) after the war, and decided to change its name to the CFDT.

### • From the First World War to our day - The MRP

We must first of all retrace the activities of *Action catholique de la jeunesse française* (ACJF) (Catholic Action for French Youth) and the Social Weeks of the CFTC...We must also follow the *Ligue de la Jeune République* (JR) (The League of the Young Republic) founded by Sangnier in 1911; it presented candidates from 1914 to 1936 for all legislative elections. Leaning resolutely to the Left in 1936, it participated in the Popular Front. Finally we must also study the *Parti démocrate populaire* (PDP) the Popular Democratic Party, the only Christian Democratic group to be a true political party with an organisation, a parliamentary group, and a newspaper, *Le petit démocrate*. We find in its ranks Georges Bidault, Robert Lecour and several future MRP ministers and deputies.

The publication of *L'Aube* gave the Christian Democrats a platform. With this newspaper, Francisque Gay concerned himself with regrouping all Christian Democrats. G Bidault wrote the editorials and it was he who made the manifesto only too clear: *'Democracy no longer needs to be defended, it needs to be established.'* *L'Aube* would allow the launching of *Les Nouvelles équipes françaises* (NEF), which prefigured the MRP (Popular Republican Movement).

On the subject of *L'Aube*, we should note this warning by General de Castelnau: *'The campaigns led by L'Aube risk poisoning the soul of the younger generations'* It was against *L'Aube* too that the Ministers Daladier and Chautemps issued a warning concerning its tendency towards conscientious objection. It was also *L'Aube* which sided with the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War; convinced that progress and the future belonged to the left whose ideology would inevitably win and thus the right tactic was to go along with this irresistible current.

### The Popular Republican Movement (MRP)

The success of the MRP in the 1946 elections was the apogee of organised Christian Democracy. This success gave the movement very great responsibilities. What did it do with them?

Its newspaper *L'Aube*, had presented an attitude that was spiritualist, democratic and national. The use of the word "spiritualist" is already revealing. From its beginning it had rallied to *L'Avenir* and the *Sillon* condemned by Rome. Some believed it to be a new party; in fact it had existed for a century.

<sup>106</sup> Quoted in *Pour qu'Il règne*, p.303-304.

The MRP wanted to be unambiguously secular, that is not only accepting republican reality and form but also its doctrine.

These were laymen in the sense that the theoreticians of the Republic gave to this word. [The French word for laymen is “laïcs” which can also be translated as “secular” it is this latter meaning that the writer refers to. - Editor, *Apropos*.] They would remain trapped in this secularism, worried that they could never show enough respect for it. They therefore expended their energies against the parties of the right and not against the enemies of the Church. They extended the hand of friendship to socialists and communists, to create ultimately a chaotic society founded on the rights of man. The main concern of the Christian Democrats (and the MRP) was to sit at the great Republican family table. The door had been half-opened to Abbé Lemire; it was opened wider still on the eve of the war to Francisque Gay and Georges Bidault for whom L’Aube had gained a foothold. With them the Ralliement ceased to be suspect; it was no longer a means of attaining high office, it became an end in itself.

‘We tremble before Liberalism, Catholicise it and society will be reborn’, said Lamennais,. Neither Liberalism nor the Revolution was catholicised. Montalembert and Lacordaire were different kind of men from the leaders of MRP who had failed, and could only fail. Christian Democracy had only succeeded in secularising itself. The MRP is a secular movement which will not conceive of the state as being anything other than secular. Its elected representatives had in their vainglory presented themselves as children of the age and would not allow themselves to be seen as the children of light. The Revolution and liberalism had snuffed them out.

The MRP bears responsibility for the 4th Republic. The Catholic Ministers had come to gather the fruits of the Ralliement, but they lacked a leader because of an erroneous idea of authority and because of their sacrosanct respect for the democratic form of State. The true notion of authority was what they lacked most. The lack of a political doctrine was their weakness. They had taken with them all the illusions and errors which had encumbered society since 1789. They had adapted and assimilated themselves. They maintained all the secularist laws of the Third Republic. They considered ‘*The Gospel as a revolutionary leaven*’<sup>107</sup>. Political error was there at the very start and, as Blanc de Saint Bonnet said, all political error is theological error put into effect. They accepted that religion is exclusively a private concern, despite all the teaching of Pius XII.

They ignored the fact that the French Democratic tradition, to which they had vowed fidelity, clashed with the secular Catholic tradition ( we are neither in the United States or Switzerland...) Our democracy demands obedience to the fundamental principles of the Left. Indeed while they did not accept the whole philosophy of the old Left, the agreement they subscribed to blurred the elementary aspects of Christian politics.

- **Christian Democracy Today**<sup>108</sup>

We will concern ourselves here with two standpoints in favour of Christian Democracy, one emanating from politicians, the other from Churchmen.

### **The Manifesto of the Christian Democratic Party**

Christian Democracy is a political party founded in Paris on the 25th May 1977 and presided over by Alfred Coste-Floret; its honorary president is Georges Bidault. It adheres therefore to the tradition of Christian democracy mentioned earlier.

<sup>107</sup> Robert Cornilleau, *Lettres à un jeune* (1927).

<sup>108</sup> On this subject see: *Éditoriaux et chroniques* de Jean Madiran, édit. DMM., 1985 and *L’illusion démocratique - Du catholicisme libéral au progressisme marxiste* by Michel Fromentoux, Nouvelles éditions latines, 1975.

At the end of 1982, the review *Itinéraires* launched a survey amongst the parliamentary opposition of the time, a survey covering 14 points, the last of which asked that the Decalogue be recognised as the fundamental law of the State. Here is the reply by the president of Christian Democracy

### **Recognition of the Decalogue**

*Christian Democracy has taken this name because the “Christian” reference “binds” and does not permit compromise. We are therefore absolutely and unreservedly in favour of the recognition of the principles inscribed in the Decalogue. This reference appears absolutely necessary to us, faced with the permissive society in which we live. We wish to gather the French not around acquired values but around “contested” values, that is to say “Christian values”.*

*But we will condemn neither the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789, whose preamble, we mustn’t forget, declares that it is made “under the auspices and in the presence of the supreme being”, nor the Declaration of the United Nations, nor the European Convention of the Rights of Man. The last two expressly take cognisance of freedom of conscience and the right to religious liberties, and this fills a serious gap in the Declaration of 1789, which is indeed incomplete.*

*With the Pope we defend “the rights of Man”, and of course man “in his totality”. We proclaim that only Christian social doctrine, to which we ourselves refer, permits a limitation of the State by the law, because it recognises, above the State, a superior norm of divine essence which it must obey and whose principles are in fact taught by the Decalogue.<sup>109</sup>*

### **Commentary**

*“Christian Democracy” admits “a superior norm” above the State. It does not see that the negation of all norms superior to the general will constitutes the very essence of the Declaration of Rights of 1789 and those of the UN. Yet this is the whole question.<sup>110</sup>*

Thus we find in this text the classical spirit of Christian Democracy since its origins: the principles of 1789 - the social doctrine of the Church, the same fight.

### **The Christian Democrat turn-of-mind manifested in episcopal declarations**

We will limit ourselves to three recent declarations (1996 and 1992)

#### **- Msgr Panafieu, Archbishop of Marseille**

*‘Secularism is a way of living together with respect for the laws of the republic and learning about difference. It is a partnership with a view to constructing a society of friendship.*

*From experience it appears that secularism may have been a stroke of luck for our country: the law of separation of Church and State permits France to live in peace.*

<sup>109</sup> Taken from No. 270 (February 1983) of *Itinéraires*.

<sup>110</sup> Comments from *Itinéraires*, *ibid*.

*The Churches revivify a society which has lost its way, proposing their spiritual patrimony and, at the same time, canonising secularism as a “way of life together” and thus paradoxically rediscovering their evangelical role as servants of man and society.’<sup>111</sup>*

### **Commentary**

To canonise secularism, to congratulate oneself on the law of separation of Church and State is to admit that these principles can co-habit usefully in the same society; however it remains the utopia of a marriage between the Revolution and the Church.

### **Msgr Gérard Defois, Archbishop of Reims**

*‘It is incumbent upon secular and Christian values to complement one another in order fraternally to promote liberty and equality in the society which is being born today’<sup>112</sup>*

### **Commentary**

Where do these secular values come from? - From pagan humanism, the Reformation and the Revolution. What are they based upon? - On the Masonic perception of humanity: the original perfection of man, his absolute independence, the denial of his supernatural end. What are these values reduced to? - The three anti-theological virtues:<sup>113</sup>

**Tolerance** - the virtue of people who deny the existence of objective truth

**Progress** - the mad hope of natural bliss which owes nothing to grace

**Solidarity** - which should assure progress by human interdependence without the mediation of Christ

To pretend to reconcile such values with Christian values once again seeks to marry the Revolution to the Church.

### **Cardinal Paul Poupard, President of the Pontifical Council of Culture**

*‘The Catholic school (...) inculturates the faith in a secularised culture.’*

*‘The Catholic school is in the front line of inculturating the faith in a secularised society’<sup>114</sup>.*

### **Commentary**

Such an approach, as the Cardinal proposes, amounts to merging the principles of the faith and those of a culture founded on rejection of the faith (because such is truly the culture called secular which has developed in France under Masonic inspiration). We must recognise that, in the rest of his speech, Cardinal Poupard

<sup>111</sup> *Documentation catholique* of 19th January 1997

<sup>112</sup> End of the article *‘Le paradoxe républicain’*, La Croix, 3rd Feb. 1996.

<sup>113</sup> Cf. Jean Vaquié, *Réflexions sur l’ennemi et la manoeuvre*, p.14.

<sup>114</sup> Cardinal Poupard, a speech at national conference of the FNOGEC of 1st February 1993, reproduced in *Enseignement catholique Documents*, June- July 1992.

proposed a mission for Catholic schools which is in order: 'to evangelise a secularised culture' by 'creating a new culture' and promoting the rediscovery of a truly European culture.'

## • Conclusion

As these last two texts have shown, the true mind of Christian Democracy survives today despite its inconsistent character. It has not changed: Msgr Pie's texts give the impression of having been written for today. This is what Msgr Hascouët observed when he said: *'There are those who pride themselves, even openly, on continuing without alteration what they venture to call "the tradition of Christian Democracy" ... It is the tradition condemned by Gregory XVI, Pius X...'* Mauriac would speak of a small group who from 1814 to 1940 had safeguarded the Gospel message. During the demonstrations for educational freedom in 1984 many of the speeches put forward as moderate seemed to have come straight from the inkpots of the *Sillon*.

The political error of Christian Democracy, as with all political error, comes from a theological error; it is tied to the Modernist heresy. And in order to explain the appeal which Christian democracy has to generous souls we must put forward in evidence two concerns exhibited by the Modernists: that of reconciling the Church with the times, and that of converting and baptising democracy.

## Reconciling the Church to the Times

This concern for reconciliation conveys not only a certain generosity but also a certain guilt complex.

Madiran in his preface to the "Religious Democracy" of Maurras noted: *'They were ashamed of the Church's past which they imagined then as they imagine today to have been one of long-standing complicity with the powers of the world, from the time of Constantine until the liberating appearance of Christian democracy, a complicity to enslave the poor and exploit them. They are mistaken about exploitation, poverty, slavery, the temporal power; their view of history is false according to the very criteria which they themselves apply: according to these criteria, the only good, the only progress consists in the increasing moral and political autonomy of the individual. Catholics know that liberty consists in knowing, loving and serving the law of God, beginning with the natural law....., when they forget it, through a democratic religion or religious democracy, they become prisoners of another religion which is no longer the Catholic religion.'*

## To baptise modern democracy

*'We tremble before liberalism, catholicise it and society will be reborn.'* We have already quoted this injunction of Lamennais. Now Maurras has shown that modern democracy was of a religious nature. The temptation to convert it and baptise it is therefore permanent. However such a stance fails to recognise the evil arising from secularism which is indissociable from modern democracy. How can we baptise an ideology?

Marcel Clement demonstrated at the Lausanne Congress in 1974 (Pluralism and Unity) that the *Omnia* of "*Omnia instaurare in Christo*" is indeed all but not anything at all. One can restore in Christ neither secularism nor individualism with all the doctrinal consequences according to which each [i.e. secularism and individualism] is entitled to grant itself any moral law whatever, or even none at all.

*'We refuse to accept that one can say that it is possible to Christianise the destruction of a part of creation.'* □

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