The future of Turkey in the European Union is very much in the balance. There is no doubt that a number of factors have led to the opinion that Turkey’s accession to the European Union as a full member may now never take place. Apart from the perilous state of the Eurozone, popular German and French opposition to Turkish accession is now clearer, and there are some who believe that the so-called ‘Conservative’ David Cameron’s effusive support for Turkey’s membership is so because he believes that it will just never happen. In addition support in Turkey has waned considerably in the face of what is seen as increasing European popular opposition. A recent British Parliamentary Committee admitted that ‘support is by no means uniform across the 27 EU Member States and enthusiasm for EU membership in Turkey has also declined as the country has turned its gaze eastwards…some commentators have cast doubt as to whether Turkey will ever join.’1

Support Nevertheless support for Turkey’s membership still commands support in certain quarters, not all European. Indeed, only recently The European Movement reiterated its support following The House of Commons Home Affairs Committee report on the implications of Turkey’s accession for the European Union, which expressed its continued support for Turkish membership, but then that is hardly surprising. Support too may be found paradoxically among some noted Euro-sceptics2. Strongest support for Turkish accession comes from the USA which sees it in America’s interest to have Turkey firmly anchored to the ‘West’. One must ask to what extent American influence has played a part in the support afforded to accession by some European nations.

Religious opposition Catholic opposition to Turkish membership is not racist, but is primarily religious. It recognises that Europe, despite its increasingly secular and atheistic nature, has strong Christian roots and a long Christian patrimony developed over the centuries, and often in the face of hostile and aggressive action by the Turks as representatives of militant Islam. Some historians suggest that, as a result of this Islamic aggression, the Turk is viewed as ‘the other’. European history is replete with Christian armies and navies repelling the Turk and Islam from Christian European land and sea. As late as 1683 the Turks were repelled from the gates of Vienna by Jan Sobieski’s army and turned back at Peterswardein in 1716 by Prince Eugene of Savoy. Our Catholic liturgy and prayers bear witness to this period of our history: The Salve Regina originated among the first crusaders; the Angelus from prayers for the success of the first crusade; devotion to Our Lady of Ransom, in response to those captured by the Saracens; Our Lady of Perpetual Succour whose image was brought to Rome by Cretans fleeing the Turk; and who does not know of Lepanto and Our Lady of the Rosary in relation to the great sea victory by Don John of Austria over the Ottomans – a victory recognised by the ejaculation to the Blessed Virgin, Help of Christians, pray for us’.3

The Armenian Question
In more recent times the treatment of the Armenians in Turkey in the late 19th and early 20th century has yet to be erased from the European Christian psyche. The treatment of the Armenians is often described as having occurred at the end of the Ottoman empire – almost it seems as a means of distancing the events from modern Turkey. But one should also recall that the 1915 massacres occurred under the control of the Young Turks, who sought a more ‘modern’ Turkey. The Turks’ role in the Armenian massacres and ethnic cleansing remains a subject of violent dispute to this day and any attempt to wring any admission from Turkey is fraught with all manner of problems. It is for that reason that successive attempts to secure a resolution in the US Congress on the Armenian genocide are continuously thwarted lest a successful resolution damage American-Turkish relationships. Nevertheless Turkish sensitivities are extremely raw.

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1 Implications for the Justice and Home Affairs area of the Accession of Turkey to the European Union The Stationery Office, 1st August 2011, p.3
2 See David Hannan, Conservative MEP, who nevertheless admits that were he Turkish he would not support EU membership. http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/303181-can-cameron-put-turkey-table
3 See Our Lady Confronts Islam by Francis Tommy-Martin. Supplement to Apropos No. 4. 1988
on this question and only recently Prime Minister Erdogan claimed that the Armenians did not ‘face genocide, but in fact had plotted to exterminate the Turks.’

**Creeping Islamisation**

Another fear which Catholics have, which is not directly related to the Turks per se, is what is perceived as the increasing Islamisation of Europe. There are already approximately 16 million Muslims living in Europe and according to the Daily Telegraph: ‘Europe’s Muslim population has more than doubled in the past 30 years and will have doubled again by 2015.’ Many of these Muslims whether on account of ghettoisation, or by will, do not integrate into the native societies in which they live (and in some respects who can blame them? – if only Catholics would integrate less into the secular-humanist society that exists today.) Furthermore the increasing appearance of mosques in European countries – a facility not accorded to Christians in predominantly Muslim countries, as well as Muslim requests for Sharia whether ‘lite’ or otherwise, and non-integration as evidenced by the wearing of the hijab or niqab makes Christians uneasy about the further erosion of ‘Western’ culture; although, paradoxically, ‘secular’ Turkey bans the veil in public buildings. It is already acknowledged, for example, in the UK that many supermarkets and fast-food outlets sell meat to their customers who are unaware that it is halal meat, i.e. approved and blessed by an Islamic cleric. This phenomenon of creeping Islamisation has attracted the pejorative description of ‘dhimmitude’ - evidence as it were that the non-Muslim in Europe is being treated as a ‘dhimmi’ (an unbeliever) would in a predominantly Muslim country where Sharia law is enforced. A phenomenon aided by secularists who seek to remove Christian elements of our culture on spurious grounds of multiculturalism – e.g. replacing Christmas by a ‘Winter Festival’ or BC and AD with BCE and CE – allegedly so as not to offend Muslims, Jews or Hindus (some of whom are often not in the least offended)…. Nor are Christians readily convinced that ‘real’ Islam is quite as beneficent as is claimed. For example Muslim reaction to criticism of Islam is regarded as intemperate. In addition there is a common perception that media types who think nothing about abusing Christian sensitivities are fearful of offending Muslim ones because of the perceived reaction. Indeed the so-called Danish Cartoons depicting Mohammed were printed by Jyllands-Posten on September 30, 2005 with an accompanying note saying it was challenging a perceived self-censorship among artists afraid to offend Islam. The reaction to the Cartoons was not too difficult to predict. Thus in a nominally Christian environment, Mohammed is perceived to be afforded more respect than Jesus Christ. It was interesting too, that ‘secular’ Turkey, albeit with an Islamist government sought ‘to block the selection of the Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen as Nato Secretary General because of Rasmussen’s role in the widely publicised Islamic cartoon crisis in 2006.’

Apart from those major attacks upon civilian targets attributed to Islamic terrorists, there remain, week in and week out, attacks on minority Christian communities throughout the Islamic world, whether it be a priest or bishop in Turkey, whole congregations in Iraq or Egypt, villages in Nigeria, individuals in Pakistan, communities in the Philippines to mention but a few. In addition the mass exodus of Christians from the Middle-East, and the fears of Christians in Egypt, Libya and Syria in anticipation of post-Arab-Spring, Islamist governments in these nations all confirm that Islam has two faces. Despite civilised discussions in western TV and radio studios concerning the ‘real’ beneficent, peaceful Islam, Christians and other Westerners are perhaps right to consider that the position in dar al-Sulh and dar al-Islam remains markedly different. Why, they ask, should we invite into the heart of Europe such a large foreign influence so inimical to European culture and religion?

There are, of course, those who see the Islamic infiltration of Europe as a challenge – as an opportunity for conversion. Although in a different time we might have considered those sentiments more readily, we think that it would be suicidal to think in those terms right now when Europe is in a state of mass apostasy.

4 http://bikyamasr.com/10430/erdogan-armenians-wanted-to-exterminate-turks/
5 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1315278/Top-supermarkets-secretly-sell-halal-Sainsburys-Tesco-Waitrose-M-S-dont-tell-meat-ritually-slaughtered.html - One has to acknowledge that foods often bear Kosher approval – but these are usually marked with the Kosher mark.
7 Although there are suggestions that the recent massacre of Copts by Egyptian troops may have been undertaken to secure a state of emergency by the Military government.
8 See more detailed explanation later.
Perhaps, in the end, Europe might not succumb to Islam as did Constantinople and those areas of the Middle East once Christian, but to invite Islam through the front door seems remarkably foolhardy.

Western Christian or secular ecumenists who do not live under or within dominant Islamic cultures often prefer to accept the peaceful face of Islam presented for Western consumption – almost a sort of wishful thinking. But Robert Hickson asks us to at least consider realistically the opposite and historic nature of Islam:

Let us clear our minds of [ecumenical] cant. Let us remove our illusions. Even though the Islamic world has suffered many injustices at the hands of the secularized, revolutionary West (especially during and since the French Revolution and Napoleon), let us not forget Islam’s own earlier history. Let us not romanticize the culture of the Seljuk or Ottoman Turks – nor the other warrior peoples who were so easily recruited and “Islamicized.”

Indeed, Sura 9 of the Koran – which is a late sura, revealed at Medina – was always found to be very attractive to such warlike people. In the words of the scholar, Gabriel Oussani:

“Sura 9 treats of the campaign to Tebuk (A.H. 9) [631 A.D. – 9 years after Mohammed’s Flight from Mecca]. It opens with the ‘release’ promulgated at the pilgrimage of the same year and declares the antagonism of Islam to all other religions. All but Muslims are excluded from Mecca and the rites of pilgrimage. Idolaters are threatened with slaughter and slavery. War is declared against Jews and Christians until they are humbled and pay tribute. This Sura is called ‘the crusade chapter,’ and in the early campaigns [of conquering Islam] was often read on the field before battle.”

Can it realistically be expected that Muslims will ever renounce and remove Sura 9 from the Koran? If they did, they would thereby renounce their own “norm of faith” – because they believe that the divine Koran is not a thing of time, but from all eternity. Let us face the facts, and not be enervated by illusions, nor destroyed through our craven self-deceptions.

**Turkish Secularism**

Those in favour of Turkish accession, however, will argue that Turkey is now a secular state – which brings to mind France with its policy of laicism. Superficially there is a similarity. Kemal Atatürk the father of Turkish Secularism is reputed to have been a great admirer of the French Revolution. His French biographer, Alexandre Jevakhoff reports that the French Revolution and its Declaration of Human Rights was to be “the supreme point of reference” throughout his life. Atatürk’s aim was to Westernise Turkey and to remove Islam from the public square in much the same way as the Revolution in France had done with the Catholic Church in France. Until fairly recently, attempts to restore Islam in public life have been vigorously opposed by the supporters of Turkish secularism, particularly by the Army which saw itself as the defender and bastion of Atatürk’s secular legacy. The Army was not slow to depose Islamic resurgence by coup or through the Constitutional Court. So dogmatic was this secularism that the presidential appointee, Abdullah Gul was opposed by the Army, because his wife had the temerity to wear the veil (hijab) at official functions in a country whose population is predominantly Muslim. But as well as the French secularist influence, Turkey also imitated Soviet Russia, in its control of Religion, where the Communist authorities controlled the Russian Orthodox Church as a state organisation.

The French commentator Tancrede Josserand in an interview in *L’Homme Nouveau* advises us that:

Turkish secularism is not synonymous with the separation of the State and Mosque. There is a Ministry of Religious Affairs which regulates all religious life in Turkey. For example each Friday, at the Friday Prayer [jum’ah], all Mosques receive a sermon written by the Minister of Religious Affairs, and all the religious officials

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11 Indeed 46% of Turks identify themselves as Muslim as opposed to 19.4% who identify themselves as Turks. (Carkoglu and Toprak, 2006)

12 *L’Homme nouveau*, No 1471, 5th June, 2010
are civil servants. It is the secularism of a concordat. But it is also a very ambiguous secularism, because 99% of the population are practising Muslims, the mosques are full on Fridays and Ramadan is followed with fervour.

Or, as the Rand report put it: ‘The military sought to institute a process of state-controlled Islamisation from above.’

Islamic Resurgence

Turkish secularism has suffered severe setbacks as a result of the resurgence of Islamic political influence in Turkey – predominantly due to the success of the Islamist AKP party. In 2002 the AKP gained around 32% of the vote which rose to 47% with their win in 2007. This year (2011) they obtained just over 50% of the vote in an 81% voter turnout, gaining 326 seats in the 550 seat parliament.

But this Islamist resurgence in Turkey is currently one with a Western face. It embraces the Market and globalisation. It did not reject the West but courted it and in doing so has placated those Western powers which sought to see Turkey mirror more closely Western liberal democracy. This the AKP did with aplomb because it saw democracy as a tool to defeat Turkish secularism and as a means of overthrowing the overbearing power of the Turkish military as defenders of secularism – a situation which was not pleasing to Western democracies either. As Josserand observes:

We can speak in Turkey of a “theo-democracy”, where the general will tallies with the will of the mass of the community of believers, the umma. (...) There is therefore a true match of Islam and democracy, which has caught out the Kemalist establishment which is authoritarian and which was never constructed with the consent of the population. Globalisation apart, the AKP has got down to dismantling the foundational triptych of the Republic, Nation-State, Secular-State, Unitary-State. Administrators, these neo-Islamists wish to be agents of the market-economy. ..... Democrats they accept the verdict of the ballot box, knowing it to be the spokesman of the real country. It is rare for them to reject it. Post-secular, they redefine secularism according to the Anglo-Saxon model. Communitarians – Islam is the majority position – the neo-Islamists consider themselves as the natural sounding board of the hopes of the dominant group.

The AKP, is political Islam in the era of postmodernity. According to the post-modernist line no ideology is more legitimate than another. As a direct consequence of postmodernity, the State is seen to be stripped of its right to nominate a universal purpose, that is to set an overall line accepted by all.

At least that is the situation for the moment – what might develop is another matter, because while Catholic doctrine recognises a distinction between Church and State, no such distinction is made in Islam. Indeed as Fr. Thomas Crean reminds us, this ‘represents, in fact, one of the many contrasts between Christianity and Islam’.

Alexandre Del Valle, too, cautions us that: ‘Islam and thus a fortiori Islamism, is in reality a system totally uniting the spiritual and temporal domains.’

Apart from the economic benefits that might accrue to Turkey from accession to the EU, it is the political benefits which most attract the AKP, as Josserand, acknowledges:

More of Europe = more democracy; more democracy = less of the army, therefore less secularism, thus more of Islam. They consider Europe as a mixture of distinct civilisations, this explains their tranquillity faced with an European model which, a priori, hardly resembles them.

Whether this hope would be realised in an increasingly aggressive secular Europe is another matter. The AKP may be leaping out of the Turkish secular frying pan into the European secular fire. Accession to the European Union may involve an Islamist Turkey being enforced to acknowledge “homosexual marriage” and

14 The Justice and Development Party
15 But short of the majority sufficient to enact constitutional change.
16 ‘L’Homme nouveau, No 1471, 5th June, 2010
17 ‘The Two Cities’, Apropos No. 27.
18 ‘Islamism – Europe and the United States Some Geopolitical Reflections’, Apropos, No.19/20, p. 120.
19 ‘L’Homme nouveau, No 1471, 5th June, 2010
other moral abominations inimical to a Muslim society but which are ultimately enforced ruthlessly in the ‘tolerant’ Anglo-Saxon model. Following Daniel Hannan, were we Turkish and Muslim we would not support EU membership.

A Religious Mafia?
The relationship between the armed forces, acknowledged defenders of secularism, and other secularists, and the AKP, the Islamist party in power, is often portrayed as the power struggle occurring in today’s Turkey. Indeed following the resignation en masse of the Turkish military top brass in August 2011, in the light of the fallout from the Ergenekon affair, the Turkish military is considered to have finally lost a battle it has been losing gradually since the AKP came to power. But there are other forces at work in Turkey which have tentacles throughout the world.

One of these, Janes Islamic Affairs Analyst advises us, is a ‘third power’ which ‘Often escapes scholarly attention…a highly co-ordinated and centralised movement with many well positioned followers known as Gulenists’. It refers, of course to the Fetullah Gulen Community (FGC) which was founded by Fetullah Gulen, a charismatic personality, who formed his own branch of Nurcu Islam and who was forced to leave Turkey by the military as he faced charges of engaging in anti-secular activities. He emigrated to the USA where, according to Janes:

"He rejected some of his earlier rhetoric on dismantling the secular state, turning instead to emphasizing tolerance in Islam, as well as interfaith dialogue with Judaism and Christianity, and shunned violence."

It brings to mind a sort of Islamic Focolare.

Gulen’s ambivalent attitude to the veil ‘widened his appeal to liberal Turks who thought of the Gulen movement as a more tolerable version of Islamic fundamentalism.’

Janes advises us that the FGC now has a global reach. It has been involved in the election of US politicians and Bill Clinton attended some of their events. According to Janes, the FGC was considered by Secularists in Turkey as having USA support ‘as a form of moderate Islam to dilute Turkish secularism.’

Aras and Caha in the Middle East Review of International Affairs claim that:

"Gulen seeks to construct a Turkish-style Islam, remember the Ottoman past, Islamicize Turkish Nationalism, recreate a legitimate link between the State and religion, emphasize democracy and tolerance, and encourage links with Turkic republics."

All this sounds indeed remarkably peaceful and liberal but it perhaps, one feels, be taken with more than a pinch of salt. As Robert Hickson once affirmed:

"For, it is my confirmed understanding that certain religions that are active today permit their members to “deceive,” to “lie to,” a non-believer, such as a “non-Muslim” or a “non-Jew.” Members of both modern Islam and Talmudic (sometimes also Cabbalistic-Gnostic) Judaism have also, moreover, very frankly told me so."

This is perhaps only too clearly confirmed by Gulen himself who is reputed to have said, that in order to reach the ideal Muslim society:

"Every method and path is acceptable [including] lying to people."

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20 An alleged plot by military officers to overthrow the AKP Government – 250 officers were arrested and detained as a result.
21 Islamic Affairs Analyst – February 2009.
22 He even managed to secure an audience with John Paul II.
23 Middle East review of International Affairs, Vol 4, No4. Dec 2000
24 R Hickson, Truth, Trust and Forgiveness, 17th July 2005
25 Islamic Affairs Analyst – February 2009, p.11
But perhaps Gulen is using the little known Islamic strategy, the Dar-al-Sulh.

Robert Hickson describes this strategy thus:

The Dar al-Sulh is an all-too-little-known category coming between the Dar al-Islam (the House of Islam and of "Peace") and the Dar al-Harb (the Zone or the House of War). The Dar al-Sulh is a useful strategic-political category devised to enable Muslims to temporize, to prepare their 'strategic advantage' (what the Chinese call Shi’i), and thus to improve their 'correlation of forces' where initially they are in a minority, as in Western Europe today. The doctrinal progression, therefore, is from the Dar al-Sulh to the Dar al-Harb to the Dar al-Islam. That is to say, this strategic category – the preparatory Dar al-Sulh – is an explicit category of deception, indeed strategic deception, to enable even a potential 'Fifth Column' within the enemy camp! … The Dar al-Sulh is analogous to the former Soviet doctrine of 'peaceful coexistence' which was manipulated within their own dialectical categories of 'the zone of war' and 'the zone of peace.'

The Janes report indicates that this might well be the case – stating that the movement’s English language press outlets serving the West have different editorial lines from those in Turkey, particularly on stories about Israel and the Jews – a difference Janes describes as ‘One voice, two messages’. At least they have the sense to know that, just as Islam may not be criticised, another force too will not tolerate criticism.

Janes reports that while the FGC has provided, solid support to the AKP...they are competing political organisations'. Janes suggests that the FGC/AKP alliance is one of convenience and that in 2009 they were in a 'symbiotic existence':

The AKP provides the FGC with an important asset, a ruling party that facilitates the appointment of FGC members to key bureaucratic positions, as well as the sheltering of FGC institutions…Meanwhile the FGC provides the AKP with money, media support and voter mobilisation.‘

Since the AKP came to power in 2002, FGC members and sympathisers are known to have been appointed to a number of important positions in Turkish Government, including ministries, as well as key positions in the Turkish police …some in Turkey believe the FGC controls the technologically apt intelligence branch of the police, as well as the strategic and overseas relations departments.‘

According to Janes, however, the FGC lacks representation in the Turkish military. The military’s antipathy to the FGC, they suggest, resulted in a campaign by the FGC media against the military and in the media exposés of the alleged involvement of military personnel in the Ergenekon plot. It is posited that FGC action will continue against the armed forces until 'it gets its members and sympathisers into the military'.

Janes concludes:

The FGC is perhaps the best organised grass roots movement in Turkey. Moreover the group has a vast social and economic organisation, intelligence assets, a global network and a message that appeals to the West, even if it appears to be mostly for international consumption.'

Dani Rodrick, in the Kuwaiti newspaper, Alwatan Daily, suggests that ‘a break between Edrogan and the Gulenists is perhaps inevitable' but that regardless who wins, Turkey 'looks more like a country heading towards authoritariansm at home and embracing adventurism abroad.’

Turkish Disillusion

As we have hinted elsewhere, the Turks are becoming disillusioned with the process of EU accession. As opposition to Turkish membership becomes clearer in some major European nations, public support in Turkey has diminished too. In 2004 73% of Turks supported Turkish membership, today it is 48% - up from a low of 38% in 2010. Although, paradoxically, there is now a higher expectation of accession (33%)

26 Islamic Affairs Analyst – February 2009. p.14
27 24th November, 2011.
28 Transatlantic Trends 2011, p.37
than in previous years. One issue which perhaps dented Turkish enthusiasm was an indication that more democracy might not mean more freedom for Islam. The RAND report observes:

*The decision of the European Court of Human Rights to uphold the headscarf ban at Turkish Universities...came as a rude shock to many AKP party members and dimmed support for EU membership within the AKP. Many AKP members had supported EU membership largely because they suspected it would strengthen religious freedom. They were disillusioned by the Court’s decision, which seemed to call into question one of Turkey’s basic rationales for joining the EU.*

**Turkish Accession Issues**

Although Turkey is anxious to secure accession to the EU it still has to overcome some formidable hurdles. Only recently the European Parliament indicated that Turkey has to make considerable progress towards meeting accession criteria and notes its slow progress hitherto. One must note that elements of these criteria would pose difficulties to any country which has a smattering of respect for the natural law. Indeed the nature of the type of European Union Turkey is seeking to enter is manifest in paragraph 30 of the EU Parliament resolution:

*Urges the Government to ensure that equality, regardless of sex, gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, is guaranteed by the law and effectively enforced; deplores the recent legal action against LGBT associations but welcomes the fact that the cases in question were dismissed by the courts; notes, however, the need for further action against homophobia and discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation as provided for in the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation to Member States on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity; calls on the Turkish Government to instruct the Turkish Armed Forces to end its classification of homosexuality as a 'psychosexual' illness; asks that the Draft Law on Combating Discrimination and Equality Committee be brought into line with EU standards, including as regards the grounds of sex and sexual orientation...*  

If the Turks can kid themselves that such smacks of religious freedom then their capacity for self-delusion is monumental. One suspects that European secularists will prove an even more resolute foe than the Turkish military.

The European Parliament resolution also requires Turkey to adopt a whole series of changes in its laws, structures and culture so as to conform to the pluralistic democratic norm of the EU. These changes are especially sought in the areas of law and order, freedom of the press and censorship, religious liberty, human rights, equality, corruption, domestic violence, honour killings and conscription, to name but a few.

It was perhaps in reaction to continual EU criticism of Turkey’s human rights record – as is evidenced in this resolution – and perhaps also as a result of Austria’s antipathy to Turkish accession, that the Turkish ambassador to Austria, Ecvet Tezcan, made an uncharacteristically undiplomatic speech attacking Austrian integration of Turkish immigrants. This drew an equally undiplomatic and rather intertemperate response from the Austrian member of Parliament, Ewald Stadler from the BZÖ, in which he excoriated the ambassador and reminded him (and fellow Austrian parliamentarians) of attacks on Christians in Turkey, including the murder of a Bishop, attacks which were not replicated upon Turks in Europe.

While one would agree that the Turkish government cannot be held responsible for Turkey’s criminal underclass save where it could be demonstrated that the authorities had taken no resolute action against it, there is no doubt that the Turkish criminal class already exerts a disproportionate effect in Europe.

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30 i.e. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (note added to quoted text by Editor, *Apropos*)

31 Presumably to allow fellow NATO suffers to feel at home (note added to quoted text by Editor, *Apropos*)


33 Alas, this was before the recent revelations of deplorable, German, neo-Nazi attacks on Turkish nationals
The Problem of Crime

The recent report by the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee,\textsuperscript{34} advises us that while the 2004 European Commission report on issues arising from Turkey’s accession:

Argued that accession would provide an opportunity for increased co-operation within the EU on border management, illegal migration and organised crime, including corruption, trafficking in human beings and drug trafficking. The report concluded that despite the advantages it would bring, the accession process in the area of Justice and Home Affairs would be complex.\textsuperscript{35}

The Home Affairs Committee therefore addressed three areas of concern: legal and illegal immigration; the security of the EU’s external borders; serious organised crime. We will concern ourselves predominantly with the last.

The Committee asserts that in its most recent Organised Crime Threat Assessment report EUROPOL, the EU’s law enforcement agency, had stated that:

Turkish criminal groups are significantly involved in various forms of organised criminality, including the trafficking of heroin from Afghanistan into Europe, of synthetic drugs into the Middle East from Europe, and of cocaine into Europe.\textsuperscript{36}

The Director of EUROPOL averred that ‘Criminal activities that originate in Turkey or pass through Turkey, have a significant impact on the internal security of the European Union.’ He admitted too that Turkish organised crime was now also involved in the production and trafficking of counterfeit Euros and that Turkey is thus becoming more important in terms of internal security.

The Drugs Trade

The Committee report informs us that Turkish criminal groups ‘facilitate’ the trafficking of heroin from Afghanistan and that the supply to Europe is controlled by 138 Turkish networks. Most of the heroin reaching Europe is sourced from Afghanistan via Turkey and the Balkans and, that within the EU, it is trafficked predominantly by Turkish and Albanian-speaking criminals. The heroin enters Turkey from Iran and is transported via the cities of Hakkari and Van to Western Turkey and then to South-Eastern Europe. No matter what routes are taken it is Turkish networks which are involved. Within the UK, Turkish organised crime controls around 70% of the heroin market.

Cocaine too, in increasing amounts is being transported via Turkey and the Balkans, being piggy-backed on the heroin routes, although most cocaine is trafficked through the Iberian peninsula, the Southern Mediterranean, and the Baltic and Adriatic seas. Some observers suggest co-operation between Turkish and Colombian traffickers in Spain in the exchange of heroin for cocaine.

State Organised Crime

In their book, The Turkish Mafia – A History of the Heroin Godfathers\textsuperscript{37}, Frank Bovenkerk and Yücel Yeşilgöz, commented on the historic links that existed between Turkish and Kurdish crooks and the Turkish governments and Kurdish rebels of the day, sufficient for them to suggest that it was ‘state organised crime’:

It should be noted that both the PKK and the Turkish government, or in any event parts of them, are involved in drug trafficking, extortion and murder, whether by organising the trafficking themselves or by profiting indirectly from it via extortion or donations from the traffickers. By engaging in these activities, they enter the field of organised crime.

They remark elsewhere:

\textsuperscript{34} Implications for the Justice and Home Affairs area of the Accession of Turkey to the European Union The Stationery Office, 1st August 2011
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid. p.3
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid. p.5
\textsuperscript{37} Published by Milo Books Ltd, 2007. http://www.milobooks.co.uk
Turkish drug trafficking turned out to be an integral part of the armed part of the armed struggle between the Kurdish PKK movement and the Turkish government. The similarity between the course of events in Suriname, Morocco and Turkey was that, directly or indirectly, the government in those countries had become partially dependent on the European drugs revenue. Some wondered whether the label of organised crime should not be replaced with another criminological offence category in this case, that of state organised crime.

Nor was this a passive State involvement. Bovenkerk and Yeşilgöz assert that, in 1989, the President Turgut Özal ‘also actively attempted to raise money from drug traffickers for Turkey;’ in other words State money laundering.

Anti-laundering laws were enacted, but ‘Despite the goodwill on paper, hardly any concrete measures have been implemented for confiscating illegally obtained profits, and very few suspicious transactions have been reported.’

This all goes to support Robert Hickson’s thesis that, in general, ‘organised crime is protected crime’, i.e. protected by political or financial elites – otherwise it would not be long organised.

In the following close paragraphs we reproduce a report by Pierre-Alexandre Bouclay which was published in L’Homme Nouveau regarding the Turkish Mafia:

How the Turkish Mafia entered Europe

According to the criminologist, Xavier Raufer, Turkey is one of the countries most affected by organised crime. The Turkish mafia there has close links with the public administration and the political class. The mafia families, established for a long time and operating on an ethnic basis, are specialised in ‘domination of Turkish businesses and the State: racketeering, extortion of funds, piracy of invitation to tender, various swindles, kidnapping, beatings, torture, contracts to cause explosions, and of course, debt collection, in a country which has elevated bounced cheques to an art form.’

The implications of the Turkish mafia in the political system and administration are immense. Xavier Raufer quotes numerous cases of relations between the courts, politics and organised crime. The links between the mafia and a number of secular parties constitutes among others one of the main causes for the success of the AKP, the Muslim movement currently in power in Ankara, which has conducted a campaign against the alliance of crime and politics.

However, the arrival of the Islamists has changed nothing since the colossal profits raked in by traffickers allows them to buy the silence of the authorities and the police.

Internationally, the Turkish mafia concentrates ‘on vehicle theft and trafficking, people-trafficking, drug and arms trafficking’ and ‘the production and trafficking of heroin to Europe’.

Turkey has become a hub for opium trafficking and, for ten years, the primary producer of heroin from raw material (opium, morphine base) from Afghanistan, via Iran. 80% of heroin consumed in European countries passes through Turkey each month, traffic which is dominated by Albanian, Yugoslavian and Turkish mafias.

Today, three or four Turkish ‘families’ control 80% of the British heroin market (intermediate and large suppliers). The heads of these ‘families’ are untouchable and extremely rich ‘businessmen’. Having at their disposal useful intermediaries in the British political classes’. The activities of these ‘families’ extend to Belgium and the Netherlands, ‘for a combined traffic in human beings and drugs’. For thirty years and on a European scale, most heroin confiscated at street level was provided by Turkish wholesalers. From the 1970s, Turko-Kurdish criminal clans have cornered the heroin market in Northern Europe to extend to the United Kingdom and Spain. The smaller scale supply of heroin (20-100kg) may be that of Albanians from Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania, but the larger wholesale supply (100kg to several tonnes) is usually Turco-Kurdish.

38 The Turkish Mafia – A History of the Heroin Godfathers.
39 [ See http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/mar/28/drugsandalcohol.ukcrime added by Editor, Apropos.]
At the end of 2000, the mafia invested in different forms of people trafficking (prostitution, children and organs) relying for this on the Turkish diaspora in Europe, often submissive but sometimes complicit. Recently, ties have formed with the Camorra \(^{40}\) clans (on the Spanish Costa del Sol) with a view to exchange Turkish heroin for Neapolitan cocaine, the mafia wanting to be able to supply direct to the wealthy and show-biz market in the Middle East which is very fond of the white powder. Other exchanges between the same parties include Turkish arms for Camorran cocaine. The latest important development is the entry of the Turkish mafia into cybercrime notably regarding bank cards now an important source of profit for organised crime.

European opinion is in absolutely no doubt about criminal reality in Turkey. In France, Switzerland or in Belgium groups exist which are akin to the Grey Wolves \(^{41}\) which commentators associate generally with the ‘extreme right’ or with Turkish Nationalism. Do they know that there is a symbiotic relationship between the Grey Wolves and the Turkish Mafia? Question: Should we allow an Islamist Turkey to join Europe? Subsidiary question: Should we enter into a hub of all criminal trafficking, where the leading classes live in perfect harmony with a very powerful and highly respected ancestral ‘mafia’? \(^{42}\)

**EU Assistance to Turkey**

One must not think that Turkey has been abandoned on its own to meet accession requirements. Between 2002 and 2010 Turkey received 3,491.5 million Euros in assistance and, in 2011 will receive a further 781.9 million Euros.

Pierre-Alexandre Bouclay observes that Turkey’s track record on accounting for this funding is anything but exemplary – even by EU standards:

> A report of the European Court of Auditors, \(^{43}\) dated 22\(^{nd}\) October 2009 and recently made public, records how the European Commission has given several billion Euros to Turkey within the framework of its ‘pre-membership’. And no one knows where this money has gone!

> Six billion Euros: that is, according to a report of the European Court of Auditors, what Brussels has poured into Turkey in the periods 2002-2007, and 2007-2013, by way of grants to its pre-membership of the European Union. The report entitled ‘The European Commission’s Management of Pre-Accession Assistance to Turkey’ \(^{44}\) was validated by the Court of Auditors at Luxembourg on 15\(^{th}\) January 2010.

> The report of the Court of Auditors advises us first of all that even though the Commission was responsible for the provision of the funding, the money given to the IPA (the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance) is for the most part ‘managed by Turkish authorities under a decentralised implementation system (DIS)’ \(^{45}\). The DIS must then distribute the funds between different projects which are claimed to bring Turkey closer to European standards.

> The object of the Court’s audit was to determine whether the Commission had managed properly the pre-accession aid given to Turkey. The outcome? Damning. The money granted by Brussels had been used anyway!

> The objectives and the range of some other audited projects, ‘did not directly address Accession Partnership priorities.’ In other words, the IPA and the DIS had financed anything without limit or verification. …

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\(^{40}\) The Naples mafia

\(^{41}\) Ali Aegca who attempted to assassinate John Paul II was a member of the Grey Wolves and was linked to the Turkish Mafia.

\(^{42}\) L’Homme Nouveau,

\(^{43}\) In its own words: ‘The European Court of Auditors is the EU Institution established by the Treaty to carry out the audit of EU finances. As the EU’s external auditor it contributes to improving EU financial management and acts as the independent guardian of the financial interests of the citizens of the Union.’

\(^{44}\) Report 16/2009 http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/3632589.PDF

\(^{45}\) Report 16/2009, Para 5, p. 9
Finally, the last part of the Court of Auditors’ report: the control and evaluation of the performance of – rare – completed projects. The result: ‘In the six years of EU pre-accession assistance to Turkey, there has been no system of ex post evaluation of individual projects or of the effectiveness of the programme as a whole in terms of meeting the accession partnership priorities and of progressing Turkey towards EU accession.’

The report finishes with a chapter of conclusions and recommendations which consider that the Commission has taken control measures following this report (published, let us recall, in 2010) but stating that ‘the effectiveness of the changes can only be assessed in the future.’

This general survey of the waste of European resources being done, let us take note of one thing: the Commission has not wasted taxpayers’ money upon the Turks out of pure altruism. The importance of the sums allotted – 1200 million Euros between 2002 and 2007 and 4800 million Euros thereafter – with the following questions: Can we still prevent the accession of Turkey to the EU. As we know, and as the example of the Irish referendum bears witness. Brussels will do all it can to neutralise the many millions of ordinary folks in the street who will have the preposterous idea of saying ‘no’.46

**Turkey’s Geopolitical Significance**

A reason for support of Turkey’s accession to the EU is that, despite its problems, Turkey is better in than out of the EU. For example the Home Affairs Committee posited:

> We believe that the risks that Turkish accession poses for organised crime in the EU are considerably outweighed by the potential benefits.

And almost as a veiled threat we are advised:

> We also fear there is a risk that, if Turkey is not permitted to join the EU, the Turkish authorities may lose their incentive to prioritise tackling criminality which affects EU Member States to a far greater extent than their own population.

A similar claim regarding Turkey’s geopolitical importance is used to support EU accession despite the fact that Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1962. During the Cold War, Turkey was seen as a buffer between the West and the Soviet Union and tied up several Soviet divisions which might have been deployed on European borders. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Turkey has improved its relations with Russia and is said to be wary of NATO’s extension towards the Russian borders because such extension may sour Russo-Turkish relations, as the RAND report acknowledges:

> Turkey has strong reservations about the enlargement of NATO to include Georgia and Ukraine, fearing that this could lead to an escalation of tension between NATO and Russia.

Nevertheless Russian and Turkish interests do not always merge. Take, for example, the proposed Nabucco gas pipeline which would provide European States with an alternative gas supply to that provided by the Russian giant GASPROM.

Europe now sees Turkey as a potential buffer against threats arising in the Middle East and Asia particularly those from Iran, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan. But Turkey too is turning its eyes to the East so much so that many observers see in this an ambition to resurrect a new Ottoman Empire. For many of these reasons the West is keen to ‘anchor’ Turkey to the West, particularly through accession to the EU. The US in particular is said to be keen to secure accession for Turkey. However Turkish-USA relations are at an all-time low and the fault for this cannot be all laid at Turkey’s door.

It is paradoxical in the least to say that the ultimate source of the rift in Turkish-USA relations lies in the relationship that one of the parties has with their mutual ally, Israel. There is little doubt that despite all its hot air about securing Turkey as an ally, the USA has a much closer relationship with Israel and, in the context of the Middle East, has often pursued Israel’s interests often to the detriment of its own. There

46 L’Homme Nouveau.
was no clearer evidence of this than the Neo-Conservative hijacking of American foreign policy to pursue Likkudist Israeli ends in Iraq – action which upset not only Arab States but the populations of most European nations too. The Turks failed to accede to some of American demands for use of Turkish air and land approaches in the attack on Saddam’s Iraq, probably with good reason, but the Turks were also aggrieved that NATO would not afford them the Patriot missiles that the USA freely granted to the Israelis against potential SCUD missile attacks from Iraq, nor did the USA help Turkey in its war against the Kurdish PKK.

If the USA can pursue policies in its own interest (or in the interest of those who exercise effective control of US foreign policy – which is not the same thing) then there is no reason why Turkey should not pursue its interests too.

The RAND report, however, notes that Turkey’s membership of NATO may be even more important to the USA than its accession to the EU.

NATO membership provides a crucial means of ensuring Turkey’s continued Western orientation, especially at a time when Ankara’s relations with the EU are shaky and could become even shakier. Turkey’s membership in NATO also represents an important hedge against any Turkish attempt to develop its own nuclear deterrent. Thus, ensuring Turkey remains embedded in NATO is strongly in the US interest.47

Turkey and Israel – A Most Ingenious Paradox?
Turkey’s relationship with Israel has ostensibly suffered since the AKP appeared to have consolidated its position in the polls. The deaths of 9 Turks at the hands of Israeli troops in the Gaza flotilla episode and the subsequent expulsion of Israeli diplomats has done nothing to improve relationships. Prime Minister Erdogan’s outburst against Shimon Peres at the Davos conference in 2009 was perhaps the first salvo in a public show of Turkish antipathy towards Israeli policies towards the Palestinians, and was also an early sign of Turkey manifesting itself as the new kid on the Middle East block.

Secularist Turkey, however, had a more harmonious relationship with Israel. It was one of the first States to recognise Israel and while its relationship was not quite as open as it might otherwise have been, it purred along without any serious discord.

This relationship was unusual for a State which, although secular, was predominantly Muslim. In the normal course of events one might have expected Turkey to side with those Arab States, some also secular, who supported the Palestinians and opposed Israel.

We recall an American friend recounting that when he was serving in Turkey in 1967 during the Six Day War, he was surprised that the Turks, he served with, wanted him to go with them and fight on the side of the Israelis! ‘The Turks said: “We know how to work with the Jews. We Seljuk and Ottoman Turks ruled Jerusalem for 550 years.” (The Turks I knew--many of them senior officers (who were candid with me as a young American officer)--despised the Arabs and noted their sloth and worse, and were at least very contemptuously condescending towards them (and made many vivid jokes about them’).”

The Donme
Perhaps this anecdotal account was evidence of yet another hidden (in the sense that it is rarely discussed) force in modern Turkey, one alleged to be instrumental in the birth of Kemalist secular Turkey – the Donme. Professor Avrum Ehrlich suggests as much when he states:

Modern Turkey has been unusually friendly in its relationship with Israel, in contrast to other Islamic States. This is especially unique as it is a key country in the region and had to resist strong neighbouring Islamic pressures to do so. While Gruen argues that it did so because it believed that emergent Israeli State would be a stabilising

48 See George E. Gruen, “Turkey’s Relations with Israel: From Ambivalence to Open Cooperation”, 112-129 in Studies on Turkish-Jewish History. (Footnote in Professor Ehrlich’s original.)
factor in the Middle East, one cannot help but wonder if it reflected the attitude of a country influenced by its famous Jewish sectarian group, the Donme.49

The Donme - Islamic Marranos

Who are the Donme? We will make reference here to the 2001 article ‘Sabbatean Messianism as Proto Secularism’ by the Jewish Professor, Avrum Ehrlich.

Sabbateanism derives from Shabbtai Zvi, a Jewish ‘messiah’ of the 17th century who allegedly converted to Islam. A group of his adherents converted to Islam too and were known as the Donme. Whatever the circumstances of their conversion, the Donme were to Ottoman Islam what the Marranos were to Catholic Spain. Ehrlich remarks:

The term ‘Donme’ is Turkish for an insincere conversion to Islam – apostate. The Donme community combined many Jewish practices in private while demonstrating Islamic practices in public. Although closed in religious doctrine, the essential direction of the theology was towards assimilation …the Donme became a home for assimilated Jews.’

The paradox of this is acknowledged by Ehrlich:

It is indeed curious and unlikely to be coincidental that the same Ottoman Empire that opened its arms to the expelled Jews of Spain and the Conversos of the inquisition should become the host to one of the most fascinating examples of mass voluntary apostasy in Jewish history. The Sultan was famed for welcoming the Jews saying: ‘Spain’s loss is my gain.’

The Donme were regarded with suspicion – ‘which proved justified, as demonstrated by the ease with which the Donme slipped into Secularism…’50

Nor were the Donme accepted by the Jewish community in the Ottoman empire. Indeed it is alleged that some of the more outrageous accusations laid against the Donme – that of sexual orgies – might have arisen from Orthodox Jewish sources wishing to malign these apostates. Although others say that these claims may have contained more than an element of truth and reflected the Donme’s attitude to sexual liberation of women within their community.

However Jewish opposition to the Donme did not prevent their future alliance, as will be demonstrated later.

The City of Salonika, then part of the Ottoman empire, was a Donme stronghold and hence the Donme were also nicknamed the Selaniki (from Salonika) and to this day the Donme refer to themselves as Salonikans and are ‘extremely non-religious’.

Salonika, according to Ehrlich, ‘was a nest of revolutionary sentiments and home to its major figures. It is no coincidence that it was home to the strongest Donme and most vibrant Jewish Community’.

Kemal Ataturk, the father of modern Turkey, was, of course, a Salonika boy and there were rumours that he too was of Donme stock. He was aware of these and once remarked:

Some people imply I am a Jew, because I was born in Salonika…But one must not forget that Napoleon was an Italian from Corsica. Yet he died a Frenchman and has passed into history as a Frenchman. People must serve the society in which they find themselves.51

One could easily deduce from this that he was acknowledging the claim rather than denying it.

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49 ‘Sabbatean Messianism as Proto Secularism’ by Professor Avrum Ehrlich
Published in Turkish Jewish Encounters, Published by SOTA ISBN 90-804409-4-9, 2001

50 Ehrlich.

51 Andrew Mango, Atatürk, p.452
The Masonic State

That the Jews and the Donme supported the Young Turks is not denied. Ehrlich states that, *The Jews and the Donme were the only minorities to support the Young Turk initiative and did so in high numbers with astounding loyalty and success.* Although, having said this, he remarks that:

> The extent to which the Jews were involved in the Young Turk revolution is debated some arguing that the Jews and Donme dominated the Committee of the Union and Progress Party which gained control of the State…Indeed British diplomats did report to the Home Office that a Jewish-Masonic conspiracy was at work favouring the revolution.

There is no lack of evidence of Jewish/Donme/Freemasonic ties. The most revealing one is that of Mehmet Cavit a leading light of the ‘Young Turk’ movement and later executed for an assassination attempt against Atatürk. Cavit was a Freemason and a Donme. *‘He had connections with French Financial circles, and both the French Government and the house of Rothschild appealed to Ankara on his behalf’* [regarding the death sentence passed on him].

This might also point to some of the financial backers of the Young Turk revolution! According to Solzhenitsyn, one famous, Jewish, revolutionary financier, Israel Lazarevitch Helphand – also known as Parvus, *rose in the world under the Young Turks and converted his financial genius from an axe hacking at the Russian trunk to a gardener’s spade mulching the Turkish Sapling.*

It is also interesting to note that when independent societies were dissolved by Atatürk, *The Freemasons declared that they no longer needed a separate organisation since they shared the aims of the People’s Party.* A situation, one might think, analogous to today in Western democracies where Masonic principles reign so supreme that the Lodge is superfluous. Indeed one might say without difficulty, to paraphrase Robert Beauvais, *‘We are all Masons now’.*

Ehrlich suggests, however, that a fear of Islamic fundamentalism has left the Donme communities less willing to admit their involvement in the Revolution. He admits, however:

> Rumours were always extant that key activists in the Revolution were of Donme stock; even Atatürk, was alleged by some to have Donme ancestry [ a rumour, we have demonstrated, he was aware of]. It was via the Masonic lodges that the Donme, the Jews, Bektashi and secularists who were less accepted in mainstream society were able to stand on an equal footing, many of them becoming major instruments of the revolution.

Ehrlich quotes Cooperman who affirms that, *‘Here [Salonika] where the Jewish Masonic organisations supported the creation of Muslim-Turkish lodges, and where Muslim Turkish newspapers supported the election of Jewish municipal assembly candidates, was the source, the combination of inter communal energies which gave the 1908 revolution its impetus.’*

Thierry Zarcone, a Masonic writer, also boasts that:

> ‘Masonry played a major role in the process of modernisation and westernisation of the Ottoman Empire.’

Furthermore the current website of the Grand Lodge of Turkey also cites Zarcone:

> According to the French historian Thierry Zarcone, the period from 1908 to 1918 could be called “The Masonic State”. The Union and Progress Party in power used Freemasonry in its foreign relations. Deputations of masonic parliamentarians went to Italy, France, Hungary and Germany. The Freemason deputies claimed that with their

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52 Ditto
53 November 1916 – The Red Wheel II, p.647. Parvus was reputed to have inspired the German plan to transport Lenin by sealed train to Russia to lead the Russian Revolution. See also Lenin in Zurich by the same author.
54 André Mango, Atatürk, p. 479
55 French author of Nous serons tous des Protestants
effort, democracy, that is the French slogan of liberty, equality and fraternity was prevailing now in Turkey and that the European powers should be of assistance.\footnote{http://eng.mason.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=17&Itemid=31}

Incidentally, the Grand Lodge of Turkey’s website blows gaping holes in that Masonic pretence that Masonry is not involved in politics.

Several observers note that Islamic fundamentalists blame the Donme for Turkey’s secular revolution, and as Islamic influence prevails one might see a progressively hostile approach towards Israel. Turkey’s hitherto warm links with Israel might well have resulted from the Donme, who, according to Ehrlich, ‘\textit{can almost be said to be the standard bearers of secularism and modern Turkish Nationalism that is based on cultural unity rather than racial characteristics’}.

From this, however, arises another question: the Armenian Genocide. While it is true that the Armenians were subjected to severe persecution under the Ottomans, there is no doubt that the most severe episode occurred in 1915 when power lay in the hands of the Young Turks. One of the fiercest critics of this barbarism was the Jewish American ambassador to Turkey, Henry Morgenthau, whose barely disguised disgust for the Turks and Germans\footnote{Morgenthau blamed the Germans for doing nothing to stop the massacres perpetrated by their allies.} is displayed in his accounts of that time. If, however, the Donme and Freemasons, were as influential as is claimed, is it quite correct to suggest, as some do, that all the blame should lie upon the Islamic Turks?

\textbf{Religious Liberty}

Despite claims that Turkey has adopted a secular model of government based on the Anglo-Saxon model, there is little evidence that it has espoused the principles of so-called ‘religious liberty’ found in Europe.

It is true that Prime Minister Erdogan has recently indicated his desire to return thousands of confiscated properties to non-Muslim religious bodies, but this means little to the Catholic Church which is not afforded any legal identity, even as a minority religion. According to \textit{Aid to the Church in Need}:

\textit{‘Turkey’s Christian community continues to dwindle reportedly due to human rights abuses. Many have sought a new life away from the periodic attacks on the Church in the media, the workplace and in public institutions.’}\footnote{Turkey – Country Profile – Aid to the Church in Need.}

In the flawed secrecy of US diplomatic exchanges, exposed by Wikileaks, the Vatican’s foreign minister, Msgr. Pietro Parolin, voiced the un-ecumenical observation that, ‘\textit{short of “open persecution”, it couldn’t get much worse for the Christian community in Turkey.’} The recent jailing of 5 Turkish Army officers as part of the investigation into the vicious murder of three Protestants – a murder, it is alleged, undertaken to destabilise the Islamic AKP government, does little to instil Christian confidence in any part of the Turkish political landscape.

\textbf{Turkey and the Arab Spring}

Whereas Turkey may have lost its role as honest broker between Israel and her Arab opponents, it has now, for the same reason – a perceived hostility towards Israel - become the darling of the Arab Spring,courting the new regimes or aspiring regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya to name but a few, and even winning the approval of Iran.\footnote{Although recently some Arab newspapers have suggested that Iran has threatened Turkey with retaliation should it invade Syria, but these reports cannot, for obvious reasons, be confirmed.} When Prime Minister Erdogan arrived in Egypt he was mobbed by admirers: ‘\textit{Muslim Brotherhood members raised banners supporting Erdogan and chanted slogans like, “Egypt, Turkey one hand”, and “Erdogan, Erdogan doesn’t fear Israel.”}\footnote{http://www.ikhwanweb.com/iweb/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=32209:mb-and-thousands-of-egyptians-welcome-turkish-pm-at-airport&catid=10411:international-affairs-&Itemid=683} Maroun Charbel, reported in \textit{Présent} that a banner bearing the following was found displayed by the Muslim Brotherhood in the streets of Cairo, stating the ‘one hand’
message in more forthright terms: ‘Turkey and Egypt are a single people. We want to share an Islamic caliphate.’ Erdogan was believed to have suggested the Turkish neo-laicist model to the Egyptians:

Now, in this transitional phase in Egypt, as well as in what comes after it, I believe that the Egyptians will establish democracy very well, and they will see that a ‘secular state’ does not mean ‘an irreligious state.’ Rather it means respect for all the religions and giving all individuals the freedom to practice religion as they please.

These remarks, which do not exactly reflect the status quo in Turkey, drew an riposte from Essam al-Erian of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s political party, a clone of Erdogan’s own AKP. Al-Erian said: ‘We do not think that he or his country alone should be leading the region or drawing up its future.’ It was generally understood that this was a rejection of the Turkish secular model and a clear indication of support for a ‘Sharia’ State. The Muslim brotherhood is divided, however, and many of the younger members favour the Erdogan approach. Indeed I could not find this criticism on the Muslim Brotherhood’s website.

Nevertheless, as an article in Hürriyet Daily News reports, many of the Islamic movements coming to the fore as a result of the Arab Spring, ‘are preaching a moderate line in an effort to avoid scaring off parts of society that are wary of parties with Muslim roots’ [and perhaps International aid too]. Whether such will be sustained if they gain power is, of course, another matter.

The Neo-Ottomans – Taking back Andalucía

The AKP’s election victory and its growing influence in the Middle East has given rise to heightened fears that Turkey has Neo-Ottoman ambitions. Such apparently was the reaction of Niall Ferguson in a Newsweek article in which he evoked Erdogan’s famous recital of the Gokalp verses: ‘The Mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets, and the faithful our soldiers.’

The reputed architect of Turkey’s Neo-Ottoman policy is said to be Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu. According to Forbes Magazine:

‘Instead of defining Turkey as the Eastern flank of the Transatlantic Alliance, Davutoglu sees it as a pivotal country, the centre point of concentric circles. The governing…AKP does not see the European Union as an end goal, and it does not regard Turkey’s western orientation as its sole strategic axis. Instead they talk of multiple axes of alliances to solidify Turkey’s leadership in the Muslim world.’

The infamous Wikileaks reported an observation by the US diplomat Eric Edelman regarding Turkey’s attempts to join the EU:

Edelman said afterward that he thought some party officials approved of the membership bid just because it would help marginalize the military while others saw it as a tool “to take back Andalusia and avenge the defeat at the siege of Vienna in 1683.”

This observation brought immediately to mind a recollection by Robert Hickson, while he served as an American Officer in the 1960s: ‘Even when I was in Turkey, the Turkish General Staff and other Kemalist officers were NOT so secularist as many people think—and they certainly had what they themselves called ‘an Ottoman Imperial Consciousness.’

Furthermore, he recalled:

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63 Hürriyet Daily News 3-10-2011, ‘“Arab Spring” breeze changes Islamists too’.
64 Gokalp, however, was a secularist!
65 Forbes, ‘A New Ottoman Empire?’ by Asli Aydintasbas 06-02-09
66 Which includes not only the Middle East but includes the Balkans (Kosovo, Bosnia, Montenegro, Albania and even European nations with a sizeable Muslim population) the Caucusus and Central Asia.
Two senior Turkish Officers said to me in 1967 in one of our deep discussions about strategy and history: ‘Robert, we shall get Grenada back.’ (They knew that I was a Roman Catholic.)

There is little doubt, that despite whatever might be thought in ecumenical (used in the broadest sense) minds, Neo-Ottoman aspirations dwell in the hearts of some Turks, whether of the secular Kemalist or Islamist Neo-laicist persuasion, and that in the hearts of both there is a spirit, Islamist or secularist, which is foreign to the ethos of modern Europe and especially to the ethos of Christian Europe. While this may be the focus for an irrational demonization of all Turks, which we abhor, it does not mean that Catholic Europe, out of some misplaced benevolence, should open the doors of Europe to a culture which is foreign, and which has often been openly hostile, to Catholicism. We wish the Turks no evil. We wish only the Good for them. But, until such time as the grace of conversion touches their hearts, and re-conversion that of Europe, we see no benefit to Europe that cannot already be obtained through friendly, but careful, legitimate commercial and industrial co-operation or by a continued military alliance in NATO as a defence against real enemies rather than manufactured ones. Provided, that is, that Turkey does not draw NATO into its neo-Ottoman designs.

Whether Turkey will remain in NATO is not so much dependant on accession to the EU as in its on-going relationship with the USA which is now at an all-time low. If the USA loses its Turkish ally it may not be Turkey’s fault but rather due to the USA’s relationship with Israel, and its pursuit of that nation’s geopolitical aims by proxy, to the detriment of its own true interests and the Common Good of the Middle East.

The very fact that Turkey arises as an issue is due to European apostasy. A Christian Europe would neither create or encourage, an Islamic (or any other) major sub-culture in its midst. It is also European secular hubris which imagines it can tinker with European demography without destroying the very concept of Europe as we know it. It is also an overweening hubris which considers that it will contain and control an increasing Islamic population in Europe. Perhaps, however, that will be yet another of the consequences of the Great European Apostasy.

Our Lady, Help of Christians, pray for us.         

ASF.